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Abstract
This paper uses a political economy approach to examine the
nature and social impact of Ireland’s economic ‘miracle’, namely the
period of high economic growth known as the ‘Celtic Tiger’, which
lasted from 1995 until 2000. Its principal purpose is to offer a broad
and multifaceted reading of this period of Irish development, paying
particular attention to the links between macroeconomic success and
social vulnerability, in order to draw policy lessons for Latin America.
The examination of the Celtic Tiger is prefaced by a brief introduction
to some of the salient feature of Ireland’s development prior to its
recent success, comparing structural features of the Irish case to those
of Latin America. The paper then introduces the Celtic Tiger phase of
development by offering data which illustrate its successes, in terms of
economic growth and increased standards of living, and of a major
growth in exports and in employment. The following section surveys
the reasons for these successes, discussing in turn macroeconomic,
fiscal and financial policy, industrial policies (attracting high levels of
foreign direct investment and fostering indigenous industry),
investment in education, the role of EU structural funds, and Social
Partnership. Conclusions are drawn which also emphasis conjunctural
factors that help account for Ireland’s success over this period. Section
four turns to the social impact of this economic success. This
examines, in turn, trends in poverty and inequality, trends in prices,
the nature of employment, the quality of social provision, and regional
and gender inequalities. This section concludes by arguing that the
concept of ‘social vulnerability’ better captures the social impact of
Ireland’s high economic growth than do explanations offered in the
neoclassical   economic  literature  or  in  the  neomarxist  sociological
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literature. Section five asks whether the Irish model is sustainable and it examines dependence on
foreign direct investment, the eroding tax base of the state and growing income inequality as
vulnerabilities of the Irish model. It also examines how the state is responding to the economic
downturn since 2000. The next section of the paper draws policy lessons for Latin America from
the Celtic Tiger, situating these in the context of responses to globalisation. The lessons drawn
relate to state potential, to the narrow base of Ireland’s economic success, and to the failure of the
state to set robust social policy goals and to find the means to achieve such goals. The paper
finishes with a brief concluding section.
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I. Introduction
Ireland has been transformed in the 1990s.1 For many years it
was regarded as one of Europe’s economic and social laggards,
performing well below potential since independence in 1922 and in
decline relative to virtually all European states, east and west (Lee,
1989). Following a surge of growth and development as the country
liberalised its economy in the 1960s and 1970s, by the 1980s it was
again showing sluggish growth rates, high rates of emigration and
growing social problems and indebtedness (Mjøset, 1992: 5-24),
meriting a debate as to whether it was ‘a Third-World country’
(Caherty, 1992). By the mid 1990s, however, all this had changed and
Ireland was being hailed as a showcase of successful development,
Europe’s Tiger Economy held up internationally as one of the few
countries which has made it in the new global e-commerce economy
(Ohmae, 2000). The Economist described it as ‘one of the most
remarkable economic transformations of recent years: from basket-
case to “emerald tiger” in ten years’ (17 May 1997: 23). As official
delegations from countries around the world beat a path to the doors of
Irish ministers, their advisers and the country’s development agencies,
Irish economists were holding Ireland up as ‘a role model for
development’ (Bradley, 2000: 22), offering ‘lessons for the periphery’
(Fitz Gerald, 2000: 55) and predicting that, over the next 15 years,
‘Ireland may achieve a standard of living among the highest within the
EU’ (Fitz Gerald, 2000: 54).
                                                     
1 Throughout this paper, Ireland refers to the Republic of Ireland.
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This paper critically examines the period of high economic growth in Ireland known as the
Celtic Tiger which lasted from 1995 until 2000. Its principal objective is to outline the nature of
what has come to be called ‘the Irish model’, credited by some analysts with providing the
conditions for this economic success and for the transformation of the Irish economy. The
particular focus of this paper’s analysis of the Irish model is to identify the links between the nature
of the model and its social impact, especially features that can be grouped under the concept of
‘social vulnerability’. It is argued that increased social vulnerability results from features of the
Irish model itself. This analysis then forms the basis for drawing some policy lessons for Latin
America. The approach used is a critical political economy approach, drawn from ‘the new
International Political Economy’ associated with theorists such as Robert W. Cox (see Cox, 1996)
and Björn Hettne (see Hettne, 1995) (see also Hay and Marsh, 1999). The theoretical work of Karl
Polanyi (see Polanyi, 1957) will inform its examination of the social impact of economic growth
and provide a framework for understanding this impact in the Irish case. This theoretical approach
diverges from the mainstream approaches used to understand the Celtic Tiger (neo-classical
economics and new growth theory, institutional economics and institutional sociology) and from
alternative approaches that have been influential in highlighting its inequitable impact on society
(dependency theory and neo-Marxism); in the course of the paper reference is made to the strengths
and weaknesses of these approaches.
The paper proceeds in the following fashion. As a way of introducing readers to the nature of
the Celtic Tiger, the first section offers some key indices of the extent of Ireland’s economic
success. Section two examines how this success was achieved, drawing on the main theoretical
approaches that have been used to interpret it, particularly neo-classical and institutional
economics, and new growth theory, as well as on the new IPE approach used in this paper. Section
three looks at some social impacts of this economic success, highlighting the ambiguous nature of
the Celtic Tiger’s impact on Irish society and critiquing the theoretical explanations offered by neo-
Marxist scholars for this impact. Having critically introduced the economic, social and institutional
features of the Celtic Tiger, Section four can then turn to examining its sustainability, drawing
some lessons from the economic downturn that began in early 2001 and how the state is
responding. Section five draws some policy lessons from the Irish experience for Latin America,
linking them to the wider context of globalisation and its impact on national states, economies and
societies. The final section draws conclusions from the study.
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II. Structural features of
development trajectories: Ireland
and Latin America
Ireland’s geographical situation has served to distract attention
from the nature of its development trajectory. Western Europe’s only
colony, its integration into the booming industrial economy of Britain
in the 19th century resulted in a classic ‘Third World’ economic
structure as the raising of cattle mostly for export became Ireland’s
main economic activity, particularly following the Great Famine of
1845-48. Meanwhile, incipient forms of industrialisation could not
survive the competition from the products of the British industrial
revolution which flooded into Ireland following the Act of Union in
1801. Only in the north-east of the island did an industrial economy
emerge as a growth pole of the British economy but the partition of the
island at independence in 1922 meant that the new southern Irish state
was ‘virtually without industries’ (Ó Gráda, 1994: 313). In 1929, 86
per cent of its exports were agricultural and the export of live animals,
mostly cattle, to Britain made up 42 per cent of all the state’s exports.
Only in 1932 was a determined attempt begun to lay the foundations
of an industrial economy through active state involvement behind high
tariff barriers. This policy has been likened by one of Ireland’s leading
industrial economists to that of Import Substitution Industrialisation in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico (O’Malley, 1992: 32) and,
following initial successes, it ran up against similar problems such as
the limitations imposed by the size of the home market and persistent
balance of payments difficulties in the 1950s. In response to these and
prompted  by  the  liberalisation of western European economies in the
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1950s, the Irish government adopted an export-oriented industrial strategy in the late 1950s and
early 1960s. Ireland therefore should most accurately be categorised as a Newly Industrialising
Country (NIC) similar to those of East Asia and Latin America. This has been recognised by many
Irish analysts (O’Hearn, 1989; Girvin, 1989; Jacobson, 1989; Jacobsen, 1994; Curtin et al., 1996,
Kirby, 1997).
Despite determined state attempts to develop the economy, however, Ireland’s performance
up to the late 1980s was seen as being ‘the least impressive in western Europe, perhaps in all
Europe, in the twentieth century’ (Lee, 1989: 521). Kennedy et al. compare Ireland’s gross national
product (GNP) to the GNP of 28 other countries, mostly European, at two dates, 1913 and 1985. At
the earlier date, Ireland’s per capita income ranked 14th and was higher than those of Norway,
Finland and Italy and only a little behind that of France. Sixty years later, however, Ireland had
fallen to 22nd place and had been overtaken by all western European countries (except Greece and
Portugal), Japan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Soviet Union (Kennedy et al., 1988: 14).
Ireland’s decline was also recognised in the international development literature. In his study of
Europe’s development, Dieter Senghaas concluded that ‘the history of Irish development is a prime
example of emerging peripheralization’ (Senghaas, 1985: 129) while J. Bradford de Long, referring
to post-World War II prosperity, grouped Ireland with Spain, Portugal, Argentina and Chile ‘that
one would in 1870 have thought capable of equally sharing this prosperity and have not done so’
(De Long, 1988 :1148). Table 1 compares Ireland’s per capita GDP with that of some Latin
American countries between 1870 and 1992.
Table 1
IRELAND AND LATIN AMERICA, PER CAPITA GDP 1870-1992
(in US$ 1990 value)
1870 1900 1913 1950 1973 1992
Ireland 1,773 2,495 2,733 3,518 7,023 11,711
Argentina 1,311 2,756 3,797 4,987 7,970 7,616
Brazil 740 704 839 1,673 3,913 4,637
Chile 1,949 2,653 3,827 5,028 7,238
Mexico 710 1,157 1,467 2,085 4,189 5,112
Venezuela 821 1,104 7,424 10,717 9,163
Source: Maddison, 1995: Table 1-3.
However, a unique feature of the Irish case that distinguishes it from Latin America is its
unique demographic profile and the effect of this on living standards. Following the Great Famine
(1845-48), a sustained tradition of emigration had resulted in a continuing decline in the country’s
population. The area that today constitutes the Republic of Ireland had a population of 6.5 million
in 1841 whereas by 1961 that population had declined to 2.8 million. Since then periods of
prosperity saw modest population increases while periods of recession resulted in net population
losses. The latter happened in the 1980s, for example, when a deep recession led to a net outflow of
people and the population fell from 3.54 million in 1986 to 3.52 million in 1991. This outflow of
people, a characteristic of a regional rather than a national economy, had the effect of sustaining
living standards in Ireland at a level above what would otherwise have been possible. As Kevin
O’Rourke has put it, emigration has been ‘one of the key driving forces in the Irish economy’
allowing rising living standards go hand in hand with deindustrialisation (O’Rourke, 1995: 420).
Without this, Ireland would have been a densely populated country and living standards would
have been far lower throughout the twentieth century. Table 2 shows how Ireland’s demographic
profile facilitated higher per capita growth than was possible in Latin America.
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Table 2
IRELAND AND LATIN AMERICA, AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH 1965-98
(Percentage)






Costa Rica 4.0 1.2
Mexico 3.9 1.5
Venezuela 2.0 -0.8
Source: World Development Indicators 2000: Table 1.1.
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III. Characteristics of the Celtic
Tiger
Accounts of the success of the Irish economy usually begin by
charting its exceptional growth rates since the mid 1990s. As Tables 3
and 4 show, this is exceptional both in comparison to past Irish
performance and to most other countries in the world.
Table 3
IRISH GROWTH RATES (GDP/GNP), 1980-2002





1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*
GDP: 2.1 4.0 2.9 6.8 9.8 7.8 10.8 8.6 10.8 11.5 5.9 3.5
GNP: 0.6 3.4 2.9 7.6 8.0 6.9 9.4 7.9 8.2 10.4 5.0 3.0
Source: Economic Review and Outlook, Dept of Finance, various years.
Notes: * estimate.
Table 4
COMPARATIVE GROWTH RATES: IRELAND, OECD, NICS









Hong Kong 6.9 3.9
Costa Rica 3.0 5.1
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Table 4 (continuation)
COMPARATIVE GROWTH RATES: IRELAND, OECD, NICS











S. Korea 9.4 5.7
Mexico 1.1 3.1
Netherlands 2.3 2.8







United Kingdom 3.2 2.6
United States 3.0 3.5
Uruguay 0.4 2.9
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 2000/01
and 2003.
In interpreting these figures, it is important to remember that in Ireland’s case Gross National
Product (GNP) is regarded as a better measure of output growth than is Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) due to the fact that foreign multinationals repatriate much of their extensive profits out of
the domestic economy. The extent of capital repatriation out of Ireland grew from 2.8 per cent of
GDP in 1979 to over 17 per cent by the end of the 1990s. GDP is used in Table 4 for the purposes
of international comparison but it should be borne in mind that it has the effect of inflating
Ireland’s growth figures, as can be seen from Table 3. Using GNP per capita instead of GDP per
capita reduces Ireland’s ranking among the 15 EU states plus Japan and the United States from
fourth place to ninth place (Forfás, 2001: Table 1). However, even when these reductions are made,
Ireland’s growth rate in the 1990s has been well above that of most OECD countries and NICs.
Secondly, from the mid 1990s to 2000 Ireland sustained growth rates double and even triple its
historical averages.
Underlining the strength of the Irish economic performance is the high growth in export
volumes throughout the second half of the 1990s as detailed in Table 5. This shows Irish export
growth to be well above that of the EU and the OECD and comparable to that of other strong
export-oriented NICs like Mexico and South Korea. Between 1995 and 2001, the value of Irish
exports grew from 35.3 billion euro to 92.5 billion euro while the trade balance grew from 9.2
billion to 35.2 billion euro over the same period (from CSO data).
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Table 5
GROWTH IN EXPORT VOLUMES 1995-2001
(% change annually): Ireland, EU, OECD and selected NICs
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Ireland 20.1 12.2 17.4 21.4 15.7 17.8 7.4
Mexico 30.2 18.2 10.7 12.1 12.4 16 -5.1
S. Korea 24.6 11.2 21.4 14.1 15.8 20.5 1.0
EU 8.9 4.9 9.0 6.8 4.7 12.6 n.a.
OECD 9.5 7.3 11.6 4.2 4.2 11.6 -1.5
United States 10.3 8.2 12.3 2.1 3.2 9.5 -4.5
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 68, 2000 and 71, 2002.
By the end of the decade, the largest increases in exports were accounted for by organic
chemicals, computer equipment and electrical machinery, all sectors dominated by US
multinationals (EIU, 2000: 28). Between 1995 and 2000, the percentage of Irish exports going to
the US market increased from 8.1 to 17.1, so that by the latter date it constituted Ireland’s second
most important export market. By 2001, 43 per cent of foreign companies located in Ireland were
of US origin and they employed 65 per cent of all employees in the foreign-owned sector (an
increase from 56 per cent in 1994). This indicates Ireland’s growing dependence on the US, both as
a source of foreign investment and as an export market, described by the Economist Intelligence
Unit as Ireland’s ‘deepening integration into the US economy’ (EIU, 2000: 28).
Against the background of virtually continuous growth in unemployment during the late
1970s and most of the 1980s, a period when fears of ‘jobless growth’ were widely aired, one of the
most remarkable aspects of Ireland’s turnaround in the late 1990s is the surge in employment. As
recently as 1997, 10.3 per cent of the labour force was unemployed but by late 2000 this had fallen
to under 4 per cent. This is all the more remarkable as the labour force itself grew at an annual
average rate of 4.3 per cent between 1997 and 2000, compared to annual average growth of 2.2 per
cent between 1990 and 1997. As a result, Ireland’s labour force had grown to an historic high of
1.83 million in 2002. Table 6 places Ireland’s employment growth in comparative perspective and
shows that, since 1997, it has outshone its rivals.
Table 6
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH 1995-2000 (% CHANGE ANNUALLY):
IRELAND, EU, OECD AND SELECTED NICS
(annual percentage change of the workforce)
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000*
Ireland 4.9 3.9 3.6 10.2 6.3 5.0
Mexico -0.6 6.5 5.5 2.7 1.3 3.4
S. Korea 2.6 1.9 1.4 -5.3 1.4 4.0
EU 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.6 1.7 1.9
OECD 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.5
United States 1.5 1.4 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.3
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 68, 2000.
Notes: * estimate.
It is not surprising that Ireland’s impressive record of export-led and job-rich growth in the
late 1990s has resulted in a very significant increase in living standards, the largest increase among
the OECD countries and NICs listed in Table 7. While these figures tell us nothing about how this
income is distributed, they do show that Ireland in the 1990s has bridged the gap in average per
capita income with its richer neighbours. The data show average annual per capita GDP growth
between 1990 and 2000; average per capita GNP for 2000 is given to show how much the GDP
figures inflate average income figures in Ireland.
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Table 7
PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH, 1990-2000:
IRELAND, OECD, NICS
(US$ PPP)




Argentina 12,377 3% 12,050
Australia 25,693 2.9% 24,970
Austria 26,765 1.7% 26,330
Belgium 27,128 1.8% 27,470
Brazil 7,625 1.5% 7,300
Canada 27,178 1.8% 27,170
Chile 9,417 5.2% 9,100
Hong Kong 25,153 1.9% 25,590
Costa Rica 8,650 3% 7,980
Denmark 27,627 2.1% 27,250
Finland 24,996 2.4% 24,570
France 24,223 1.3% 24,420
Germany 25,103 1.2% 24,920
Greece 16,501 1.8% 16,850
Ireland 29,866 6.5% 25,520
Israel 20,131 2.2% 19,330
Italy 23,626 1.4% 23,470
Japan 26,755 1.1% 27,080
S. Korea 17,380 4.7% 17,300
Mexico 9,023 1.4% 8,790
Netherlands 25,657 2.2% 25,850
New Zealand 20,070 1.8% 18,530
Norway 29,918 3.1% 29,630
Portugal 17,290 2.5% 16,990
Singapore 23,356 4.7% 24,910
Spain 19,472 2.3% 19,260
Sweden 24,277 1.6% 23,970
Turkey 6,974 2.1% 7,030
United Kingdom 23,509 2.2% 23,550
United States 34,142 2.2% 34,100
Uruguay 9,035 2.6% 8,880
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002; World Development Indicators database,
2002.
The 1990s also marked a turnaround in Ireland’s unique demographic profile, as outlined in
Section One. Over the course of the 1990s Ireland’s population showed a sustained increase, to
reach 3.9 million in 2001 a figure it had last reached in the 1880s. Over the years since 1997,
slightly less than half the annual increase was made up of immigrants (some of them former Irish
emigrants returning home).
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IV. Recipes for success
The causes of this remarkable success have, not surprisingly,
merited sustained attention. Most of this analysis has been done by
economists working within a neo-classical economic framework or
from the standpoint of new growth theory. For these economists,
Ireland’s high economic and employment growth in the 1990s derives
from its ability to achieve high levels of productivity and maintain cost
competitiveness with its trading partners. This view was summed up
by Paul Krugman in a paper on Ireland’s economic success: ‘Given the
combination of good productivity growth and wage restraint, the
success of the economy is in a macro sense not hard to explain’ (1997:
42). This tells us nothing however about how these were achieved nor
why their achievement produced such dramatic results in the mid
1990s. For example, one senior Irish economist, Frank Barry, has
found that Irish productivity growth was ‘substantially higher than the
EU average since the late 1960s’ whether measured in GDP or GNP
and he put this down both to productivity increasing within individual
sub-sectors of the economy but also to low-productivity sub-sectors
being replaced by high-productivity ones (Barry, 1999: 34-35). This
points therefore to the need to examine the particular policy and
institutional mix that resulted in Ireland’s economic success. While
there are disagreements about the relative contributions of different
elements such as exchange rate policy, social partnership or industrial
policy, there is broad agreement in the economic literature on those
elements that are seen as having played essential parts in Ireland’s
success story. The account here concentrates on these rather than
entering the debates on their relative merits. They can be identified as
follows: macroeconomic, fiscal and financial policy, investment in
education, industrial policies, EU transfers, and social partnership.
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A. Macroeconomic, fiscal and financial policy
As Leddin and Walsh have written, ‘a high degree of continuity and consistency in the main
parameters of economic management’ has been evident across all the main Irish political parties
over recent decades (1997: 15). Since the economic liberalisation of the early 1960s, this consensus
included agreement on an essentially outwardly-oriented economic policy, on active state industrial
policies focused primarily on attracting high levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Ireland, on
investment in education, on respect for property rights and, since 1973, on membership of the
European Union. While disagreement between government and opposition was evident in the late
1970s and early 1980s over the growing resort to foreign borrowing to finance job creation in the
public sector in response to the impact of the 1970s oil crises, since the mid 1980s a solid
consensus has also been evident on the need for a more conservative and stable fiscal policy,
reducing the ratio of debt to GDP and balancing the national budget. The more recent disciplines
introduced by the EU in preparing for economic and monetary union (EMU) have further
reinforced this policy consensus. Buoyant government tax revenues during the years of high
economic growth resulted in budget surpluses, making it relatively easy for the Irish government to
meet the budgetary requirements for EMU membership. In 1999 the surplus was €1.3 billion out of
a total budget of €29.6bn and in 2000 the surplus reached €2.4bn. By 2001, the surplus was
reduced to €323m and in 2002 this turned into a deficit of €655m out of a total budget of €31.8bn.
This allowed €3.2bn to be spent on servicing the national debt in 1999 but by 2002 this had
declined to €2.2bn. Reduced receipts from income and corporation taxes in 2002 forced the
government to cut back both social and capital expenditure though the Minister for Finance was
arguing in Brussels that Ireland should be allowed to maintain high levels of capital spending to
improve Ireland’s deficient infrastructure even at the risk of infringing EU rules on budget deficits.
In this context, the role of Structural Funds in helping the government run a budget surplus
should also be noted. However, while such EU transfers supplement public expenditure, they do
not replace it since matching funding from national governments (and from the private sector) is a
criterion for receipt of such funds. Undoubtedly they helped ease pressures on the national
government for spending in certain areas (see sub-section iv below for a fuller discussion). But the
potential of such EU transfers to facilitate a counter-cyclical fiscal policy is extremely limited by
the fact that funds are disbursed to fund previously agreed six-year programmes; once these are
agreed public authorities have no more discretion over the use of these funds. In many cases the
funds are paid directly to specially established public bodies which operate at arm’s length from
central government.
The cross-party consensus on macroeconomic and fiscal policy has also included a
reluctance to resort to any major privatisation of the relatively large state sector of the economy,
particularly in public utilities and transport. Therefore, where state companies have been privatised,
this has happened for pragmatic reasons in individual cases (banks, telecommunications,
petroleum, steel) rather than out of any widely shared ideological commitment. Furthermore, these
cases date from after the emergence of the Celtic Tiger. The Irish state continues to have a
relatively large nationalised sector and the 1997-2002 government included a Minister for Public
Enterprise indicating the continuing economic and political significance of this sector.
The turnaround in state finances from the unsustainably high levels of foreign borrowing that
characterised the early 1980s is usually dated to the austerity budget introduced by the minority
incoming Fianna Fáil government in early 1987. To achieve this fiscal correction, the new
government resorted to expenditure cuts rather than tax increases, resulting in significant
reductions in current and capital spending. These measures were supported in the national interest
by the main opposition party, Fine Gael, though it has seen its base of support continuously eroded
since then. In a best-selling recent book on the Celtic Tiger co-authored by the then finance
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minister, Ray Mac Sharry, he described how he used to go into his ministry on a Sunday to identify
expenditure cuts that sometime saved the government as little as IR£1,000 (around US$1,200)
(Mac Sharry and White, 2000). Against what was predicted, this contraction resulted not in a
recession but in an increase in economic growth and was labelled by some economists as
‘expansionary fiscal contraction’. They argued that the cutbacks restored confidence in the public
sector leading to a resurgence of private consumption and investment which more than offset the
deflationary effect of the fiscal correction. The growth of the foreign debt was halted, confidence
was restored in the Irish pound and interest rates began to fall to levels close to those in Germany
(for an account, see Leddin and Walsh, 1997). This is seen by most economists as putting in place
the conditions that allowed Ireland benefit from the US boom that began in the early 1990s.
Exchange rate policies during this period also contributed to creating these conditions.
Ireland had maintained a fixed exchange rate of one Irish pound to one pound sterling following
independence in 1922 and this lasted until the creation of the European exchange rate mechanism
(ERM) in 1979. With the advent of ERM, the Irish pound was pegged to the German mark (DM)
though expectations that this would stabilise the value of the Irish currency and lower interest rates
were initially disappointed. It also led to repeated speculative attacks on the Irish pound,
particularly during periods when its rate to sterling hit the competitiveness of Irish exports to the
UK, still its principal market. This led to Irish pound devaluations in 1983, 1986 and 1992 the last
two of which are credited by economists with giving continued competitive gains to Irish exports as
the real exchange rate did not quickly revert to its pre-devaluation level. Exports to Ireland’s two
principal markets, Britain and the US, continued to gain following the advent of economic and
monetary union (EMU) at the beginning of 1999 as the euro depreciated in relation to the sterling
and the US dollar. However, one consequence of the loss of Ireland’s national currency is, as
Leddin puts it, that ‘the adjustment process has moved from money and foreign exchange markets
to fiscal policy and on to the labour market’ (2001: 50). In this situation, he foresees that the
economy is likely to be more sluggish in reacting to economic shocks and predicts that booms and
recessions will tend to be longer increasing the possibility of abrupt about-turns or hard landings.
Of relevance in this scenario is Lane’s conclusion in his study of Irish fiscal policy that it has ‘in
general not behaved countercyclically’. He adds that ‘this imposes costs on the Irish economy that
are likely to become more severe’ under monetary union (Lane, 1998a: 14).
B. Industrial policies
‘While the stabilization of the public finances may have encouraged an increased inflow of
FDI, the export boom and acceleration in the growth rate must be attributed mainly to the latter,
rather than viewed as an inescapable consequence of the former’ (Walsh, 1996: 85). This quotation
draws attention to the central importance of state policy in attracting high levels of FDI to Ireland.
As Fitz Gerald put it: “The pro-active industrial strategy pursued by Irish policy makers was central
to the long-term development of a strong industrial base” (2000: 38). This focused on the attraction
of foreign multinational firms to establish in Ireland. Only more recently has a modern, high-tech
and export-oriented indigenous sector emerged. Both sectors are treated separately here.
a) The foreign sector:2
In O’Riain’s memorable phrase, the Irish state has since the early 1960s assumed ‘the role of
“hunter and gatherer”’ of foreign direct investment (FDI) (O’Riain and O’Connell, 2000, 315).
                                                     
2 Officially the Central Statistics Office defines the foreign sector as comprising those industrial units where the owners of 50 per cent
or more of the share capital are non-nationals. Since most foreign investment into Ireland has been greenfield investment and since
mergers and acquisitions have played a relatively minor role in attracting foreign investment, the foreign sector is largely composed
of the subsidiaries of foreign companies in Ireland.
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While this policy, led by the Industrial Development Authority (IDA), pre-dates the emergence of
the Celtic Tiger, it came to fruition in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In many ways the IDA
resembles the insulated bureaucracies of the East Asian developmental states (see Campos and
Root, 1996; Leftwich, 1996) in that it is a state body with, since the late 1960s, autonomy from the
civil service, extensive resources and effective insulation from the political process. Indeed, in the
extensive account by Padraic White, its managing director from 1981 to 1990, it saw itself as often
making the policy which its ministerial bosses followed (Mac Sharry and White, 2000). In
establishing the need for such a body, White quotes from a report written for the Irish government
in 1952 by a US consultancy group, IBEC Technical Services Corporation, in which one heading
stated: ‘Not sufficient government initiative for socialism – not sufficient incentive for private
enterprise’ (quoted in Mac Sharry and White, 2000: 185). Though first established in 1952,
following its reorganisation in the late 1960s it became ‘the centre of policy making’ with a strong
focus on attracting FDI (O’Riain and O’Connell, 2000: 317). White identifies two elements of what
he calls the IDA’s ‘competitive nationalism’ (Mac Sharry and White, 2000: 239). The first, to
which he returns again and again in his account, was the special low-tax regime put in place firstly
in the mid 1950s as 100 per cent exemption from tax on export profits guaranteed for 15 years and,
under EU pressure, changed in the late 1970s to a 10 per cent tax rate on manufacturing profits
guaranteed for 20 years. This incentive, to became a blanket 12.5 per cent tax on all trading
companies in 2003, is described by White as ‘the unique and essential foundation of Ireland’s
foreign investment boom’ (250). The second element is to identify growing industrial sectors
appropriate to Ireland, to find the best companies in those sectors and to persuade them to come to
Ireland.
This policy, pursued with determination and not a little charm, had by the 1990s succeeded
in attracting to Ireland some of the world’s leading companies in three key sectors: i) healthcare
(pharmaceuticals and medical devices), ii) electronics and iii) software and other international
services. By the late 1990s, 150 foreign companies in the first sector employed 25,000 people in
Ireland and constituted 20 per cent of the country’s exports. In 1998, 94 per cent of all foreign
investment went into manufacturing and 6 per cent into services, principally financial services
(OECD, 2000b: 205). The second sector had become the single largest foreign industrial sector in
Ireland and ‘has been at the heart of the rapid transformation of the country’s economic and jobs
prospects’ (ibid.: 281), employing 28,000 and constituting 30 per cent of the country’s exports.
With 20 of the 25 top US high-tech companies having operations in Ireland, White believes that ‘a
critical mass of investment from technology companies has been secured’ (290). In the third sector,
27,000 were in fulltime employment in Ireland in foreign-owned international services, including
financial services. Inflows of FDI to Ireland increased from $164 million in 1985 to $24 billion in
2000 (UNCTAD, 2002: 172). US investment made up the bulk of this, constituting more than 80
per cent of the overall flows into Ireland in the later years of the 1990s (O’Sullivan, 2000: 263-64).
As White proudly puts it, the question for foreign entrepreneurs had changed from ‘Why should we
go to Ireland?’ to ‘Why are we not in Ireland?’ (Mac Sharry and White, 2000: 311). The extent of
Ireland’s success in attracting FDI, compared to other European countries and NICs, is detailed in
Table 8.
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Table 8























United Kingdom 7.4 38.7
Uruguay 0.0 1.5
Source: World Development Report 2002.
However, an industrialisation strategy so heavily dependent on attracting foreign investment
entails its own vulnerabilities, as White acknowledges:
‘The nature of industry keeps changing there is a continuous process of decline in some
sectors (for example, textiles and mechanical engineering) and growth in others (software and e-
commerce). So we can assume that a fair share of the industries we have today will decline and
decay in coming years. Thus, we need to be continually searching for the emerging star sectors that
are competitive in an Ireland of rising costs compared with others in an enlarged European Union.’
In cautioning that the IDA’s job is never done, he concludes: ‘If Ireland Inc is closed for
business, other competitor countries will quickly take our place.’
In examining the extent to which foreign MNCs become embedded in the Irish economy, the
literature on Irish industrialisation has again and again drawn attention to the need to capture more
of the cutting-edge research and development activities of multinational companies since they are
regarded as providing more benefits to the host economy, both in terms of employment (quantity
and quality) and of survival (see, for example, Kearns and Ruane, 2001). However, in his more
detailed analysis of the software sector, O’Riain draws attention to the difficulties involved. While
he acknowledges that Ireland has become an operations hub, developing its own information
technology agglomerations or districts, he finds that the attempt to get MNCs to locate product
development in Ireland runs up against companies’ desire to keep control and is likely to have very
limited success (O’Riain, 1997: 195). O’Sullivan examines research and development (R&D)
spending by foreign companies and their spending on indigenous inputs to find whether, in the
1990s, their increased activities are having a greater developmental impact in the Irish economy.
With the exception of the instruments sector where R&D spending by multinationals increased
substantially from 0.7 per cent of gross output in 1991 to 2 per cent in 1997, she concludes that
‘R&D intensity was flat or even declined in the sectors most heavily dependent on foreign activity’
(O’Sullivan, 2000: 269). While higher levels of activity by multinationals has led to an increase in
spending in absolute terms in the Irish economy, she writes: ‘It is certainly not possible to identify
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a trend towards a deepening of linkages between foreign and indigenous companies at least through
the analysis of the aggregate behaviour of foreign companies’ local purchases; if anything, in fact,
the evidence points in the opposite direction’ (270). Her verdict on the main thrust of Ireland’s
industrialisation strategy over the past four decades points to its vulnerability and limited
embeddedness:
‘Ironically, as Ireland has become more integrated with the European Union in
macroeconomic terms, the microeconomic structure of her industrial economy has evolved to more
closely resemble a region of the United States. The country’s dependence on the United States,
especially in sectors that are notoriously volatile like electronics, means that Ireland is highly
exposed to the risk of a significant diminution in recent US economic exuberance. Although
evidence of a significant deepening of the relationship between foreign multinationals and their
Irish bases might well be grounds to temper such a view, the analysis of R&D expenditure and
linkages does not provide support for such an interpretation’ (283).
b)  Indigenous industry:
The emphasis on winning FDI had, for decades, marginalised indigenous industry within
overall industrialisation policy. However, as O’Riain put it: ‘It took the massive social and
economic crisis of the 1980s to delegitimate the IDA’s role as the sole bearer of the task of Irish
industrial transformation. It was into this restricted institutional space that the alliance of Irish
technical professionals and the previously marginalized ‘science and technology’ state agencies
stepped to support indigenous industry’ (2000: 181). The reorganisation of the state’s industrial
development agencies in 1994 resulted in an agency for the development of indigenous industry,
Forbairt (later renamed Enterprise Ireland), being established alongside the IDA. Meanwhile, the
general tenor of policy was shifting towards greater selectivity in grant giving, and a greater focus
on marketing and technology and on indigenous firms (O’Riain and O’Connell, 2000: 319).
As a result of these new approaches to industrial policy, O’Malley detectes signs of ‘a
substantial and sustained improvement in the growth performance of Irish indigenous industry’
over the decade from 1987 to 1997, across a wide range of industrial sectors and indicators such as
employment, output, exports, profitability and spending on R&D (1998: 35). Furthermore, he
argues that the improvement was more than a response to stronger domestic demand conditions and
indicates a genuine improvement in competitive performance. However, in their analysis of
Ireland’s comparative advantage, Gallagher et al. discover a continuing dualism between foreign
and Irish-owned firms even at the peak of the Celtic Tiger period. They write:
‘Foreign-owned industry treats Ireland as an export platform, generating 74 per cent of total
Irish exports in 1998. On the other hand, while 85 per cent of local plants are Irish owned and 53
per cent of manufacturing employment is generated in these plants, they produce just 28 per cent of
gross output’ (Gallagher et al., 2002: 64).
Listing Ireland’s top 30 companies ranked by turnover, they illustrate that the electronics and
pharmaceuticals sectors are dominated by foreign-owned companies while successful Irish firms
are in sectors that still enjoy relative protection such as cement, print and packaging, food
processing, retailing, and brewing and distilling. Looking for evidence of the emergence of
‘clusters’ particularly through backward linkages from foreign-owned high-tech industries, they
find some evidence in the electronics and telecommunications equipment industries, such as the
development of labour skills and a growth in exports by indigenous firms, though from a small
base. They say it is too early to judge whether this will lead to a cluster of foreign-owned and
indigenous industries. Other possible emerging clusters are in indigenous meat and dairy products
(though here it is concentrated in primary products), and in the tourism industry.
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It is in the software industry that the clearest evidence has emerged of a ‘cluster’ in which
strong indigenous firms have emerged. Together with electronics, software accounts for 40 per cent
of all exports from Ireland, generating $5 billion annually. This makes Ireland the largest exporter
of software in the world (Gallagher et al., 2002: 67). While it was the scale of FDI by many of the
world’s largest software companies that led to the emergence of the industry in Ireland, the number
of indigenous firms grew rapidly, from 336 start-ups in 1993 to 561 in 1997 (Foley and Hogan,
1998: 49). Employment grew from 3,801 in 1991 to 9,200 in 1997, which was around half the total
level of employment in the industry, and the value of exports by these firms increased from £61
million to £365 million. Meanwhile, R&D spending by them in nominal terms went from £4.6
million in 1991 to £34.6 million in 1997, at which time it was spending twice as much on R&D as
its foreign-owned counterpart (O’Sullivan, 2000: 273-4). It is therefore seen as the major success
story of Irish indigenous industry in the 1990s. O’Riain found that this industry emerged ‘almost
“by accident”’ with little state policy encouraging it and low levels of state resources supporting it
(O’Riain, 1997: 198). While some firms emerged to provide services to industry, others from the
spinoff by firms of their software divisions and yet others from on-campus research in universities,
he finds local factors (such as informal networks within the technical community that resulted from
state investment in technological education) predominant in the emergence of the sector. O’Malley
and O’Gorman conclude:
‘The indigenous software industry can be regarded as part of something rather like a
“cluster”, in the sense used by Porter (1990). This cluster includes relatively influential customer
industries such as overseas TNCs in the process industries, software, computer hardware,
telecommunications equipment and financial services, as well as indigenous firms in the process
industries and financial services. “Related” industries in the cluster include in particular the
foreign-owned branch of the software sector and the foreign-TNC dominated telecommunications
equipment and computer hardware sectors. The strong geographic concentration of the software
industry in urban areas within Ireland is also indicative of “clustering” in Porter’s sense of the
term’ (2001: 318-19).
However, questions have been raised about whether such clustering may be replicable in
other sub-sectors. O’Malley and O’Gorman point out that software presents lower entry barriers
and has offered significant scope for new or small Irish firms to develop in many specialised niches
serving segmented markets. O’Riain finds that while the costs of setting up such companies are
relatively low, the costs of accessing marketing and distribution networks in order to compete
globally are very high. Thus, he points out that two-thirds of these companies employ less than 10
people (though this is not dissimilar to the structure of the industry in the US and Europe). The task
of ‘going global’ he sees as being both costly and risky as companies form alliances, typically in
the case of the Irish software industry with US companies. While such joint ventures offer
increased access to resources and social networks they also reduce the autonomy of the firm and
the industry as a whole and he finds that ‘a typical pattern for Irish software firms has been the
acquisition of successful firms by TNCs once they reach a certain level of turnover’ (1997: 204).
c)  Conclusions:
In assessing the success of Ireland’s industrial policy, therefore, the boom years of the Celtic
Tiger must not be allowed obscure the structural vulnerabilities that characterise Ireland’s
industrial base. Gallagher et al. point out: ‘The recent success of the Irish economy has not been
built on the strength of its national system of innovation and improvement. Rather, the remarkable
turnaround in its fortunes has been driven to a large extent by foreign-owned firms in the
electronics (including computers), pharmaceutical and financial services industries’ (2002: 77).
They report that US firms have earned an average rate of return of 25 per cent on their Irish
investment, more than ten percentage points higher than that achieved by them in other EU
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countries, and conclude: ‘Ireland has been established as a transatlantic trading hub for US
multinationals that use Ireland as an export platform into Europe and more recently into the US’
(ibid.). The impact on indigenous firms is summarised by O’Sullivan: ‘Indigenous success is
concentrated in a small number of firms and sectors and certainly cannot be found across all, or
even most, indigenous firms. Moreover, as the example of the indigenous software industry reveals,
favourable developments are as yet of too recent a vintage to interpret them as firm grounds for
forecasting continued success’ (2000: 283). Compared to indigenous industry, the foreign-owned
sector has continued to show greater dynamism as it has increased its share of employment, output
and exports, as shown in Table 9. In 2000, manufacturing employed 19 per cent of the labour force,
contributed 42.4 per cent of output and constituted 93.7 per cent of Ireland’s exports.
Table 9
CONTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN-OWNED SECTOR TO IRISH ECONOMIC GROWTH:
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT, OUTPUT AND EXPORTS
(percentage)
Year Employment Output Exports
1987 43% 52% 74%
1999 49% 76% 90%
Source: O’Malley, 1998, 35, Census of Industrial Production 1999, UNCTAD 2002.
According to Murphy, five main areas of high-tech foreign-owned industry (soft drinks
concentrates, chemicals, medical and pharmaceutical products, computers and computer software)
contributed 53 per cent of net output and 13 per cent of manufacturing employment in 1995
(Murphy, 1998: 14). In 1998, Ireland’s top three exporters were all multinational companies (Intel,
Dell and Microsoft), accounting for 22 per cent of Ireland’s manufactured goods exports and 18 per
cent of the country’s total exports (Forfás, 2002). Barry, Bradley and O’Malley conclude that, in
general, foreign plants tend to be larger, more productive and more profitable than Irish plants,
employing substantially higher proportions of skilled labour and paying an average wage that, in
1995, was approximately 25 per cent higher than in indigenous industry (1999: 51-54).
C. Investment in education
One of the factors identified by economists as accounting for Ireland’s success in attracting
high levels of FDI is the quality of its labour supply. Therefore the expansion of educational
provision over decades is another factor widely credited with the success of the Celtic Tiger (for
example, Mac Sharry and White, 2000: 364-66). The publication in 1966 of an OECD report on
Irish education, entitled Investment in Education, is seen as marking the beginning of a major
expansion in educational expenditure and participation. Educational expenditure increased from 4.1
per cent of GNP in 1961 to slightly over 8 per cent in the 1990s (Lynch, 1998: 6) and education
continued to receive privileged treatment during the economic downturn of the 1980s even as many
other sectors experienced severe cuts in expenditure (Fitz Gerald, 1998a: 35). Between 1965 and
the late 1990s, the proportion of students participating in full-time education rose from 50 per cent
to 100 per cent for 15-year-olds, and from 25 per cent to 81 per cent for 17-year-olds. Wickham
sums up some of the achievements of this 30-year expansion: participation rates have caught up
with and overtaken British rates; the proportion of the Irish age cohort completing second-level
education is about the EU average while the proportion gaining a third-level qualification is well
above the EU average; within third-level education an unusually high proportion of students is
studying science and engineering thus eroding the traditional focus on the liberal professions in
Irish education; and standards in maths and science performance seem to be relatively high by
international standards (Wickham, 1997: 281). As a result of this expansion, the percentage of
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those who leave school with a Leaving Certificate qualification rose from between 10 and 15 per
cent in the early 1960s to over 80 per cent in the 1990s. The numbers with no qualification on
leaving school fell from about 20 per cent to less than 5 per cent over the same period (McCormack
and Archer, 1998: 19).
The significance of this expansion can only be assessed by looking at trends over time. Thus,
the percentage of the population that has completed at least upper secondary education has
increased from 27 per cent of the 55-64 age group to 64 per cent of the 25-34 age group. However,
this is still lower than in most OECD countries. Contemporary participation rates show an
improvement in this situation as the percentage of the 15-18 age group in education is around the
OECD average but starts falling to below the average after age 18 and is particularly low from age
20 onwards. Furthermore, targets contained in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) to
increase participation rates at the upper secondary level to 90 per cent by 2000 and to 98 per cent
by 2007 are not being met and the participation rate remained at 81 per cent in 1999 (CPA, 2002:
28). Barrett, Callan and Nolan note that, over the period 1985 to 1994, the proportion of those aged
18 to 21 enrolled in tertiary education in Ireland doubled and they find a significant enhancement in
the levels of educational attainment of those entering the labour force in the 1980s and 1990s
(1999: 80). However Don Thornhill, the chairman of the Higher Education Authority and a former
secretary of the Department of Education, warns that ‘despite the clear evidence that we are making
considerable progress in closing the gaps, the overall education attainment levels of our population
of working age would still be below the EU and OECD averages by the year 2015 unless we
continue to improve our participation and completion rates’ (1998: 50). Figures from the mid 1990s
for educational achievement among OECD countries show Ireland to come in ninth and eleventh
place out of 23 countries for achievement by 13-year-olds in science and mathematics respectively.
On tables ranking literacy levels among 16 to 25-year-olds and 46 to 55-year-olds, however, Ireland
ranks towards the bottom of 12 countries (Forfás, 2001: 105).
D. EU structural funds
The contribution of EU structural funds to the Irish success has been likened by some
analysts to the impact of Marshall Aid on other European economies at an earlier period (Ó Gráda,
2002; Ó Gráda and O’Rourke, 2000). Designed to promote convergence in economic growth and
living standards between the poorer regions of the Union and its core regions, the structural funds
were reformed and expanded in the context of the completion of the single market in the late 1980s.
These comprise the European Regional Development Fund (which dates from 1975), the European
Social Fund and the Guidance section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund.
To these was added in 1993 a Cohesion Fund, available to the ‘cohesion countries’ of Ireland,
Spain, Portugal and Greece whose per capita GNP was less than 90 per cent of the EU average at
the time. These funds were allocated in multiannual packages known as Delors I (1989-93) and
Delors II (1994-99) and disbursed through programmes drawn up by national governments in
consultation with the EU Commission (known collectively as the Community Support Framework,
CSF). A third package of structural funds is currently in place for the period 2000-06. In order not
to displace national funding, these funds are based on the principle of additionality, requiring
complementary national public and private funds. O’Donnell writes that Ireland’s receipts from the
Structural Funds can be compared to World Bank estimates of aid flows to middle-income
countries. However, he adds that when receipts under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are
taken into account (these include agricultural production subsidies and price supports as well as
direct income payments to farmers), Ireland’s net receipts from the EU averaged over 5 per cent of
GNP throughout the decade; the highest percentage was in 1991 when receipts reached 7.6 per cent
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of GNP (O’Donnell, 2000: 185). Table 10 gives details of EU transfers to Ireland since it joined the
then European Economic Community in 1973.
Table 10









1973 IR£m 0.0 37.1 37.1 0.0
1974 IR£m 3.6 63.8 67.4 0.12
1975 IR£m 6.9 102.2 109.1 0.18
1976 IR£m 17.5 102.0 119.5 0.38
1977 IR£m 27.8 245.1 272.9 0.50
1978 IR£m 44.6 365.6 410.2 0.68
1979 IR£m 132.6 396.5 529.1 1.74
1980 IR£m 179.5 381.1 560.6 1.99
1981 IR£m 202.2 304.6 506.8 1.86
1982 IR£m 257.8 344.3 602.1 2.07
1983 IR£m 286.0 441.7 727.7 2.10
1984 IR£m 222.1 644.6 866.7 1.50
1985 IR£m 292.1 836.6 1,128.7 1.85
1986 IR£m 262.6 884.0 1,146.6 1.50
1987 IR£m 360.7 739.6 1,100.3 1.90
1988 IR£m 323.1 838.5 1,161.6 1.62
1989 IR£m 331.9 963.4 1,295.3 1.50
1990 IR£m 454.3 1,286.7 1,741.0 1.87
1991 IR£m 866.8 1,334.4 2,201.2 3.40
1992 IR£m 880.4 1,113.6 1,994.0 3.28
1993 IR£m 963.5 1,281.6 2,245.3 3.35
1994 IR£m 667.7 1,173.7 1,841.4 2.14
1995 IR£m 873.0 1,150.2 2,023.2 2.58
1996 IR£m 855.0 1,364.5 2,219.5 2.27
1997 IR£m 986.8 1,519.8 2,506.6 2.35
1998 IR£m 1,100.3 1,274.5 2,374.8 2.04
1999 €m 995.8 1,723.0 2,678.8 1.30
2000 €m 920.7 1,681.4 2,602.1 1.04
2001 €m 904.5 1,584.3 2,488.8 0.93
Total: €m 16,235.8 29,355.2 45,590.9
Source: MacAleese, 2000: 96; Department of Finance unpublished figures.
These net contributions to Ireland’s development compare very favourably to levels of
Official Development Assistance (ODA) received by Latin American countries over the same
period, as summarised in Table 11. While a number of these surpass the percentages received by
Ireland, in all cases these are the poorer countries with levels of GDP not comparable to those of
Ireland. In many cases, also, these were received in the form of loans, not grants as in the Irish case.
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Table 11
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA
1990 AND 2000





















Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2002.
EU structural funds are credited with having had a significant impact on Ireland’s
development in two different ways. The first is on economic growth and living standards through
their contribution to the productive potential of the economy while the second concerns their
institutional impact on the quality of decision-making in the public sector. In Ireland, the funds
were allocated under four broad categories with 36 per cent going to infrastructure (roads, ports,
communications), 28 per cent to human resources (training, programmes to assist early school
leavers), 26 per cent in aids to the private sector (grants or subsidies to expand or develop new
industries) and 10 per cent on income support (particularly important in rural areas) (these
percentages relate to the allocation of the Delors II package). Evaluating their impact, Fitz Gerald
estimates that the 1994-99 package had the cumulative effect of raising GNP by between 2.5 per
cent and 3 per cent by the end of their period and he predicts that they will have a longer-lasting
effect in raising GNP by about 1 per cent above what it would otherwise have been.3 GNP per
capita will increase by a smaller amount due to population increase (including immigration) but it
will be 0.7 per cent higher in 2010 than it would otherwise have been while the funds also had a
positive impact on the balance of payments, on the government surplus and on the debt/GNP ratio
(reducing it by 5 percentage points by 2010 over what it would otherwise have been). He
concludes: ‘The long-run impact of the two CSFs will be to raise the level of GNP by about 2
percentage points above the level it would have been without them’ (1998b: 689). The second
impact relates to their contribution to developing a more efficient administrative culture in the Irish
public service. At one level, this resulted from the fact that, as the OECD pointed out, they ‘raised
the quality of public investment outlays by forcing the introduction of longer-term project planning,
so that short-term budgetary pressures have not led to stopping an undertaking with the extra cost
of subsequently re-starting it’ (OECD, 1999: 44). That this stimulus quickly followed the cuts in
public expenditure in 1987 is seen as particularly fortuitous in the Irish case as, without the
structural funds, ‘Ireland could have found itself suffering from under-investment in the face of
                                                     
3 This assessment of the longer-term effects of the Structural Funds is based on the fact that their impact on demand is transitory and
is limited to the period over which they are spent while their impact on supply takes time to build up but persists long after they are
spent.
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rapid growth in recent years’ (Fitz Gerald, 1998b: 683). But, perhaps more importantly, the
requirement that national government draw up comprehensive national development programmes
and consult interested parties in the private sector and civil society on their design and content, as
well as establish permanent monitoring committees representing the EU, the state and private
interests, has been credited with acting as ‘a stimulus to policy innovation and experimentation’, by
re-introducing developmental thinking and procedures to the Irish public service, by creating a
culture of monitoring and evaluation, and by helping decentralise policy-making (O’Donnell, 2000:
187-189).
Overall, the impact of the structural funds is perhaps most evident in the fact that Irish per
capita GDP had gone from 66 per cent of the EU average in 1985 to 119 per cent in 2000.
However, in the western half of the country, per capita GDP only came to 83 per cent of the EU
average so that the Irish government divided the country into two regions for the purpose of
maximising its receipt of structural funds in the 2000-06 package, creating a BMW (border,
midlands and western) region which remained eligible for core funding (known as Objective 1
funding). This points to an overall characteristic of developments within the EU, namely that
‘inequalities across states have fallen by 25 per cent, whereas regional inequalities within states
have risen by 10 per cent’ (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002: 59).
E. Social Partnership
Social partnership is widely seen as among the most innovative aspects of the Celtic Tiger.
Laffan and O’Donnell speak of ‘the emerging Irish model of economic and social governance’ that
has grown from the series of national agreements since 1987 (Laffan and O’Donnell, 1998: 165). In
a report for the OECD on local partnerships and social innovation in Ireland written by Professor
Charles Sabel of Columbia Law School, the Irish effort ‘to foster development and welfare through
new forms of public and private local co-ordination ... in a way that blurs familiar distinctions
between public and private, national and local, and representative and participative democracy’ is
held up as an example for the countries of the OECD to follow (Sabel, 1996: 9). A report for the
National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) described Ireland’s social partnership approach as
‘one of the most significant developments in public policy in the European Union’ (NESF, 1997:
9).  More specifically, the social partnership approach is seen as having ‘produced the much needed
recovery and has underpinned a sustained period of growth since then’ (O’Donnell and O’Reardon,
1996: 34).
In Ireland, social partnership is the term applied to institutional mechanisms through which
key economic and social policy objectives are coordinated among sectoral interest groups – the
state, trade unions, business organisations and farming organisations – traditionally known as the
social partners. Since 1996 voluntary and community groups (working with the poor and
disadvantaged) have also been included among the social partners. As Walsh et al. state: ‘Social
partnership has strong cross-party political support … [and] has in effect been elevated to a shared
political ideology, which infuses all aspects of public policy-making and with minimal dissent’
(1998: 15-16). It finds its most visible expression in the series of three-year national agreements,
from the Programme for National Recovery (PNR, 1988-90) to the Programme for Prosperity and
Fairness (2000-02), which have been widely credited with playing a major role in Ireland’s
economic success through trading wage restraint for tax cuts and thus reinforcing cost
competitiveness. These agreements are innovative in that they include not just wage negotiations
but consensus on a wide range of economic and social policies – including tax reform, welfare
payments, social spending and numerous items of industrial, social and development policy. Each
agreement has been preceded by a comprehensive report on national economic and social
development drawn up by the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), itself representative
CEPAL - SERIE financiamiento del desarrollo N° 129
31
of the social partners. As economic growth resumed, the agreements began to include more
ambitious commitments to social equality and inclusion, including the National Anti-Poverty
Strategy (NAPS). From its institutionalisation at national level, the principle of partnership has
been broadened and finds expression in a bewildering array of partnership bodies, at national,
regional and local level, and also at firm level. These include an estimated 65 local development
partnerships, about 80 local service partnerships, over 100 community development organisations,
local enterprise and employment partnerships, and urban regeneration partnerships. Core funding
for these bodies has been provided under the EU Structural Funds. As part of a wide-ranging
reform, partnership bodies are being integrated into the workings of local government. A National
Centre for Partnership has been established to help achieve these goals.
Concluding that social partnership embodies important institutional innovation, as
O’Donnell does, may overstate its significance. Instead, as Walsh et al., emphasise, it has emerged
not in response to any overall guiding design but rather as a series of pragmatic piecemeal
responses to immediate institutional, policy and political pressures, facilitated by large amounts of
EU funding (Walsh et al.,1998: 60-63). Whether it can survive in the period following the end of
the boom when funding is less easily available and when consensus is giving way to growing
distributional conflicts will be its real test. Furthermore, despite the rhetoric that claimed
partnership more effectively addressed social exclusion, evidence given in Section four below
shows that it has been ineffective in preventing increases in relative poverty and income inequality
that partnership agreements and programmes have been ineffective instruments for redistributing
income towards the less well-off. Representatives of the voluntary and community sector have
complained at the vague nature of commitments to social inclusion contained in these agreements
or of the fact that targets set depend on resources being made available (Kirby, 2002a: 137). In the
light of its outcomes, Irish social partnership seems closer to what Teague calls ‘competitive
corporatism’ (Teague, 1998: 120). Instead of representing an up-dated form of the traditional social
bargain between capital and labour, he sees them as a means of improving domestic
competitiveness through reducing unit labour costs but as offering little to organised labour by way
of pay increases or a better social wage. Despite this, trade unions support them as a way of
maintaining an institutional and political role. Undoubtedly local partnership bodies have acted as a
catalyst for enterprise creation and community development as well as providing services
appropriate to their local areas (see Turok, 2001). However, they are also seen as being primarily
the creatures of central government, heavily dependent on external (mostly EU) funding and
direction and functioning largely independent of one another and of local government, resulting in
a lack of local co-ordination and public accountability (Walsh et al., 1998: xv). Activists have
voiced the perception that ‘Partnerships are coming to be seen as useful vehicles for off-loading
complex and intractable problems by centralised policy makers and programme providers’
(Foreman, 1998: 37). Finally, fears have been voiced that social partnership ‘represented a major
shift in power from elected representatives to full-time officials in the civil service and the
organisations of the major interests’ (Ó Cinnéide, 1998: 47). ‘It is, of course, neither participative
(except for a small group of activists) nor democratic in any ordinary sense of that word’ (50).
F. Conclusions
While the neo-classical economics literature draws attention to the macroeconomic
conditions needed to achieve growth, and new growth theorists as well as institutional economists
place emphasis on active state policies such as industrial and educational policies and social
partnership, international political economy points to the importance of wider conjunctural factors
in Ireland’s success. Some of these relate to timing and coincidence in that the creation of a single
market within the EU following the passage of the Single European Act in 1987 added to Ireland’s
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attraction for US investment since locating in Ireland now gave access to the whole EU market.
That this coincided with the beginning of a long boom period in the US economy was a major piece
of good luck which Ireland helped turn to its advantage. Among other conjunctural factors further
reinforcing these trends was Mary Robinson’s presidency, the Northern Ireland peace process and
the Clinton presidency’s interest in it. During her period as President of Ireland (1990-97),
Robinson actively reached out to those of Irish descent around the world, creating what she called
the ‘Irish diaspora’ members of which began to take a practical interest in Ireland’s development.
With his active interest in Northern Ireland, Clinton ensured that Ireland featured prominently on
the political agenda of the White House during a period in which the conditions were ideal for a
major expansion of US investment. A final boost to Ireland’s export performance was given by the
decline of the value of the euro relative to the US dollar and to sterling following its creation at the
beginning of 1999.
But there was a second set of conjunctural features related to demography which also turned
positive for Ireland at the same time. These relate to Ireland’s exceptional demographic profile,
partly due to the baby boom of the 1970s and partly to the effects of high emigration in the 1950s.
This had resulted in a high dependency ratio during the economic downturn of the 1980s as Ireland
had a large youth population in proportion to the working population. Now, however, with the
decline in fertility and in the birth rate, Ireland finds itself in a highly favourable situation as it has
a declining dependency ratio with both a declining youth population and a relatively small elderly
population (the result of 1950s emigration). Economists estimate that it will be 2015 before the rate
of old-age dependency will rise rapidly as it is currently doing elsewhere in Europe thus making
greater demands on social spending. Allied to the favourable demographic situation is the reversing
of Ireland’s traditional pattern of emigration as a tightening labour market attracts Irish skilled
labour home. As Fitz Gerald put it: ‘Part of the recent transformation in society and the economy
must be attributed to this influx of additional skilled labour with new ideas and skills, and new
approaches to the many problems which Ireland faces’ (Fitz Gerald, 2000: 32).
Irish success therefore owes itself to a far more complex and varied set of factors than simply
‘getting the fundamentals right’ or to state policies. For this reason, it is not likely to be easily
replicable. While state action created some of the necessary conditions, it seems unlikely that these
on their own would have proven sufficient to create the booming economy of the late 1990s. As the
OECD concluded:
‘Unfortunately, it would seem that there has been no “silver bullet” – no single, overriding
policy that could be adopted elsewhere in order to emulate Irish experience. Rather the breaks in
trend, first around 1987, when the deterioration ceased and performance improved, and then around
1994, when the boom began, are attributable to the confluence of a series of favourable changes in
the environment and other exogenous factors (some of which were specific to Ireland and are
unlikely to be replicated elsewhere), as well as prudent planning and a range of policy shifts that
lay the foundations for the pickup in growth. Most of the items that have contributed to the
improvement are well known to other policy makers, but other countries’ situations may not be so
propitious as to allow such a strong response, even to fully appropriate incentives and institutional
arrangements’ (OECD, 1999: 10).
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V. Social impacts of economic
success
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the ambiguous nature
of the social impact of high levels of economic growth. It does this by
detailing in turn trends in poverty and income inequality, in prices, and
in employment. Evidence of a reduction in the quality of social
provision and trends in regional and gender inequalities are also
briefly examined. The section ends by commenting on the
inadequacies of how social well-being is measured and argues that the
concept of ‘social vulnerability’ offers the potential to capture
important dimensions of the lack of social well-being in a context of
greater economic liberalisation.
A. Poverty and inequality
Extensive debate has taken place on the impact Ireland’s high-
growth economy has had on poverty. The most authoritative data are
provided by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). These
are drawn from the Institute’s large-scale household surveys of 1987
and 1994-2000 (the latter, entitled the Living in Ireland survey, was
the Irish element of a wider EU survey and was updated annually) and
they provide data on what they call consistent poverty and relative
poverty. The former measure is composed of the percentage of
households who fall below relative income poverty lines and also
experience deprivation in that they lack one or more items on a list of
eight basic indicators of deprivation. This list includes, for example,
new rather than second-hand clothes, a meal with meat, fish or chicken
Macroeconomic success and social vulnerability: lessons for Latin America from the Celtic Tiger
34
every second day, a warm waterproof overcoat, and heating. There are major differences therefore
between the way poverty is measured in Ireland and in Latin America. Irish measures are based
primarily on income and are measured against average incomes whereas in Latin America poverty
is measured against a level of expenditure required to purchase a basket of goods considered
essential to survival. Poverty analysts consider that there can be considerable differences between
households deemed ‘income poor’ and those deemed ‘consumption poor’ since income is not
necessarily used for family consumption. In Latin America, a distinction is made between ‘poverty’
and ‘indigence’ based on the level of expenditure used (the indigent having a level of expenditure
simply allowing survival whereas the poor have a higher level of expenditure allowing for some
wider participation in society). In Ireland, the distinction is between ‘consistent poverty’ and
‘relative poverty’; the former combines relative poverty and consumption poverty (the lack of
essential items) whereas the latter relates poverty to average incomes. The different bases of
measurement make it impossible to compare poverty levels in Ireland and Latin America; the
closest one can get is to compare levels of inequality based on inequality ratios as is done in Table
15 below.
In public discourse in Ireland, the measure of consistent poverty has come to be regarded as
being similar to a measure of absolute poverty. Table 12 shows the trends in consistent poverty
under the Celtic Tiger.
Table 12
PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS IN
‘CONSISTENT POVERTY’, 1994-2000
(percentage)
Poverty line 1994 1997 2000
40% of average income 2.4 3.1 2.9
50% of average income 9.0 6.7 5.1
60% of average income 15.1 9.7 6.2
Source: Nolan et al., 2002: Table 5.6, p 39.
In their 2002 report, however, those who compile these data urge that the set of deprivation
indicators be amended to take account of ‘the way poverty itself can be reconstituted in terms of
new and emerging social needs in a context of higher societal living standards and expectations’
(Nolan et al., 2002: 63). This acknowledges, therefore, that poverty is always a relative concept.
Looking at trends in relative poverty under the Celtic Tiger however reveals a far less benign
outcome. This is detailed in Table 13 which shows the percentage of households living below
poverty lines drawn at 40 per cent, 50 per cent and 60 per cent of average income.4
Table 13
PERCENTAGES OF HOUSEHOLDS FALLING BELOW
POVERTY LINES, 1994-2000
(percentage)
Poverty lines 1994 1997 2000
40% average income 4.9 6.3 11.8
50% average income 18.6 22.4 25.8
60% average income 34.2 34.3 32.9
Sources: Nolan et al., 2002: Table 3.2, p 19.
                                                     
4 The equivalence scale used gives each additional adult a value of 0.66 and each child a value of 0.33 in calculating the total number
of ‘equivalent adults’ in the household.
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As well as the substantial increase in relative poverty, the data also reveal a consistent
growth in the depth of poverty below each income line meaning that ‘those falling below relative
income thresholds are falling further and further behind the middle of the income distribution’
(Nolan et al., 2002: 22).
Consistent with the growth in relative poverty, the Living in Ireland surveys also show a
growth in inequality during the 1990s, after 20 years of remarkable stability in Irish income
distribution data. The ESRI sums up the change as follows:
‘In the mid 1990s the bottom 10 per cent of households had about 2 per cent of total income
whereas the top 10 per cent had about 27 per cent. However, between 1994 and 1998 there was a
redistribution of over 1 per cent of total income away from the bottom 30 per cent of the income
distribution – representing a substantial shift in a short period. The increasing inequality reflects a
shift from the bottom half of the distribution to the top half, rather than to those right at the top’
(Nolan, Maitre, O’Neill and Sweetman, 2000: xix).
Data for the period 1987-1998 for disposable income are given in Table 14.5 (Updated data
to 2000 is not available at the time of writing.) This illustrates the decline in the share of the bottom
30 per cent of the population consistent with the poverty data above and the increase in the share of
the fifth to the ninth decile. It also illustrates that the top decile has seen its share decline slightly,
though survey data on high income earners are unreliable as they tend to underreport their income.
Table 14
DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSABLE HOUSEHOLD INCOME, 1987-1998
(percentage)
Decile 1987 1994 1998
Bottom 2.0 2.3 1.8
2nd 3.4 3.3 3.0
3rd 4.8 4.6 4.4
4th 5.9 6.0 6.0
5th 7.3 7.5 7.7
6th 8.8 9.1 9.5
7th 10.7 11.1 11.3
8th 13.2 13.5 13.5
9th 16.5 16.5 16.7
Top 27.4 26.4 26.1
Source: Callan and Nolan, 1999: Table 8.3,  p 173; Nolan, Maitre, O’Neill and
Sweetman, 2000:  Table 3.11, p 31.
More recent data from a different source confirm the increase in income inequality over the
period of the Celtic Tiger. These come from the Central Statistics Office’s Household Budget
Survey, a periodical survey of household expenditure. Comparing the situation in 1994-95 with that
in 1999-2000, this reveals that the average disposable income of households in the top two income
deciles increased by over 61 per cent while that of households in the bottom two deciles increased
by 37 per cent. Households in the intervening deciles recorded average increases of between 46 per
cent and 55 per cent. The ratio between the average weekly disposable income of households in the
highest income decile compared with those in the lowest decile rose from 11:1 in 1994-95 to 13:1
in 1999-2000 (CSO, 2002).
                                                     
5 Disposable income is gross income (direct income earned from employment or from investments plus state transfers such as
unemployment benefits, children’s allowances, old age pensions) less direct taxes such as income tax and employee share of social
insurance contributions.  It thus gives an estimate of the income accruing to households after transfers have been added and taxes
paid.
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In interrogating the impact of economic growth on social well-being, it is important to know
how Ireland fares compared to other countries. Were levels of poverty and inequality in Ireland
found to be relatively low in international terms, then the social impact of its economic growth may
be judged somewhat less harshly than would otherwise be the case. The first comparison is the
Human Poverty Index for 17 industrialised countries contained for the first time in the UNDP’s
1998 Human Development Report. Entitled a ‘poverty index’, it combines four elements –
longevity (the percentage of people not expected to survive to age 60), knowledge (the percentage
of people who are functionally illiterate), living standard (the percentage of people living below the
income poverty line set at 50 per cent of the median disposable income) and exclusion (the
percentage of the labour force who are unemployed for 12 months or more). It thus constitutes a
more multifaceted measure of poverty than do measures based on income poverty alone. From
1998 to 2002, Ireland occupied the second lowest place (the United States was in lowest place) on
the index though there was movement among other countries up or down the index. Table 15
broadens the comparison, including a group of Latin American and East Asian countries. The
inequality ratio (IR) is derived from the ratio of the income of the top 20 per cent to that of the
bottom 20 per cent of the income distribution.
Table 15
INCOME INEQUALITY: IRELAND, OECD COUNTRIES AND NICS
(Inequality Ratio)
Country IR Rank Country IR Rank
Austria 3.2 1 Britain 5.6 14
Norway 3.5 2 S. Korea 5.7 15
Finland 3.6 3 Australia 5.8 16
Denmark 3.6 4 Canada 7.2 17
Sweden 3.6 4 Ireland 8.0 18
Belgium 3.6 6 Hong Kong 8.7 19
Germany 4.1 7 United States 9.4 20
Japan 4.3 8 Singapore 9.6 21
Netherlands 4.9 9 Costa Rica 12.9 22
Italy 5.1 10 Mexico 13.5 23
Taiwan 5.2 11 Chile 17.4 24
Spain 5.3 12 Brazil 25.7 25
France 5.6 13
Source: Kirby, 2002a: Table 3.7, p 60.
On this ranking, Ireland is also found to be close to the bottom of the OECD countries and
behind a number of East Asian NICs. These data illustrate that Ireland has high levels of poverty
and inequality compared to other comparable countries and that these already high levels have
tended to worsen over the period of the Celtic Tiger.
Finally, the period of the Celtic Tiger has seen a dramatic increase in the share of national
income going to profits and a concomitant decrease in the share going to wages, as detailed in
Table 16.
Table 16
WAGE SHARE OF NATIONAL INCOME, 1987-2000 IRELAND, EU, US, JAPAN
(percentage)
Country 1971-80 1987 1990 1995 2000
Ireland 77.3 71.2 67.8 64.7 57.2
EU 75.3 72.0 71.2 69.1 68.6
United States 70.0 68.7 68.3 67.2 67.7
Japan 78.0 73.9 72.0 73.4 70.7
Source:  European Economy, No 69, 1999.
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As Lane puts it, this shows ‘a radical factor income shift away from labour and towards
capital’, a trend which he finds coincides with the beginning of social partnership in 1987 (Lane,
1998b: 225). While Lane argues that this environment of wage moderation and high profitability
results in greater employment and encourages inflows of foreign capital, it also illustrates how state
actions result in growing benefits to capital at the expense of labour.
B. Prices
Assessing the impact on living standards of the dramatic increases in per capita income
between 1990 and 1998 detailed in Table 5 requires, firstly, that they be put in the context of rising
costs over the same period and, secondly, that the distribution of income be taken into account. For,
if costs have risen faster than incomes or if the increases have gone disproportionately to a small
proportion of the population, the living standards of the majority may not have improved over the
period.
The combination of moderate income increases under social partnership agreements with
reductions in income tax and (up until 20006) low inflation resulted in ‘substantial gains in real
living standards for those in employment’ between 1987 and 99’ (NESC, 1999: 237). The National
Economic and Social Council calculated that the cumulative increase in real take-home pay for a
person on average manufacturing earnings over this period was around 35 per cent (236).
O’Connell also found real increases of between one-fifth and one-third in the purchasing power of
all household types over the period 1987 to 97 (O’Connell, 2000: 84-5). However, since inflation is
estimated without taking into account increases in house prices, these estimates neglect increases
over the period in the greatest expenditure item facing most people over their lifetime. As Drudy
and Punch point out, up to 1994 new house prices increased broadly in line with the consumer price
index, house building costs (labour and material costs) and average industrial earnings. ‘Since
1994, however, house prices have diverged significantly from these other indices and have
increased at a significantly faster rate than house building costs’ (Drudy and Punch, 2001: 248).
Nationally, the average new house price for which loans were approved increased by 104 per cent
from 1994 to 1999 while, in Dublin, the increase was 136 per cent (248). As a result, ‘access to
home ownership based on principal incomes has been eliminated for low-to-average-income
households and an increasing number of middle to higher income households… Access to owner
occupation is now limited to joint mortgage holders with combined incomes considerably higher
than national average wages’ (Downey, 1998: 34)7. Drudy and Punch report data on the
occupations of those receiving loan approval which shows that professionals make up an increasing
proportion of house buyers while representation of those from all other social classes has declined
steadily since 1994 (2001: 250).
Meanwhile, ‘the housing poverty of low- and below-average income groups residing in the
[rented] sector will worsen as increasing numbers of households are left with less disposable
income, reduced savings and are forced to occupy the worst accommodation in terms of quality,
condition and location’ (Downey, 1998: 50). A greater demand for rental accommodation is driving
up rents in the private rental sector thereby forcing low-income groups out. Since the late 1980s,
the state has neglected public, local authority housing whose role has become increasingly
residualised over the 1990s (Fahey and Williams, 2000: 237). Taken together these trends have
                                                     
6 While inflation was only 1.5 per cent in September 1999, by October 2000 it had reached an annual rate of 6.8 per cent (EIU, 2000:
25).
7 According to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), allowing for inflation, residential property prices between 1995 and 1999
increased by 76 per cent in Ireland compared to 41 per cent in Finland and the Netherlands, 31 per cent in Denmark and 29 per cent
in Norway. The increase in France over the same period was only 2 per cent while prices fell by 8 per cent in Germany, 9 per cent in
Italy and 12 per cent in Japan (Keena, 2000).
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exacerbated housing need; Drudy and Punch estimate that in 1998 at least 150,000 persons were in
serious housing need (Drudy and Punch, 2001: 245). The numbers of those who are homeless in
Ireland has at least doubled over the period of the Celtic Tiger: in 1991 an official assessment
calculated that there were 2,751 homeless people in Ireland over the age of 18. By 1999, the
official figure stood at over 5,000 and was regarded by experts as a significant underestimate
(Hayes, O’Neill and Weier, 2002: 6).
These trends have the effect of further worsening wealth inequalities in Ireland as those who
own property see the value of their holding fast increasing while those who don’t own property are
left further behind. As Gray and Clarke recognise, the increase of over 247 per cent between 1992
and 1997 in property and equity prices ‘has disproportionately benefited those individuals who
hold an above average share of these assets’ (1998: 35). The abolition of residential property tax in
1994 and the absence of capital gains tax on residential property added to these inequities since the
holders of such profitable assets had their tax liability reduced.
Increased housing costs is also a contributory factor to a related trend, namely the decline in
the household savings ratio during the 1990s. From a peak of over 11 per cent during the 1992-93
currency crisis, the savings ratio was relatively stable in the 8-9 per cent range over most of the
decade. However, since 1998 it declined sharply, from 9.6 per cent to 6.4 per cent in 2000.
Alongside this has been a strong growth in personal borrowing over the decade; in real terms,
personal credit grew by more than 250 per cent between 1993 and 2000 (Lane, 2001: 3-5). As a
result, the ratio of personal debt to personal disposable income increased from 43 per cent in 1990
to 69 per cent in 2001, most of it happening towards the end of the period. ‘The vast majority of
this increase has been in borrowings for housing purposes. House mortgage finance and other
housing finance amounted to just over 29 per cent of personal disposable income in 1990. By 2001
this had risen to 52 per cent’ (Duffy, 2002: 49). McCoy et al. conclude that ‘the rapid rise in the
ratio of personal debt to income suggests that the exposure of households to an economic shock has
increased. The fact that this increase has been largely due to a rise in borrowing for housing
purposes indicates the extent to which the economy is exposed to a shock affecting the housing
market, such as a sharp upturn in interest rates or an employment shock’ (McCoy et al., 2000: 23).
Lane identifies the under 35 age group as being particularly financially vulnerable in the event of
an economic downturn (Lane, 1998b: 5).
In this situation therefore many people may not feel their living standards have improved
under the Celtic Tiger. In a survey at the end of 2000, only 45 per cent of respondents believed
themselves financially better off then they were two years previously, while 44 per cent saw no
change and 10 per cent believed themselves worse off (The Irish Independent, 30 December 2000).
C. Employment
The second major way in which economic growth is seen to have a beneficial impact on the
living standards of the population is through the increase in employment since the mid 1990s, as
detailed in Table 4. However, there has been disagreement over the nature of the employment being
provided by the Celtic Tiger. For example, Tansey argues that ‘occupations requiring high levels of
qualifications and skills have exhibited particularly rapid growth’ with the result that ‘Ireland is
becoming a highly qualified “white collar” economy’ (Tansey, 1998: 41). On the other hand,
O’Hearn concludes that the employment increase has been ‘heavily concentrated among low-wage,
often part-time service occupations that are dominated by women’ (O’Hearn, 1998: 98-9). It is
important therefore to examine more closely what types of jobs the Celtic Tiger provided though
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the fragmented nature of employment data that is available in Ireland make firm conclusions
difficult.8
The greatest employment growth between 1994 and 2000 has taken place in services. While
industrial employment increased from 343,600 to 476,200 over the period, employment in services
increased from 729,200 to 1.064 million. Within industry, most new jobs came in construction
which showed a rise of 44.9 per cent as against a rise of 18.6 per cent in manufacturing industry.
Figini and Görg (1998) found decreasing wage gaps within manufacturing industry over the recent
period showing that Ireland’s industrial structure does not display a marked divide between a
highly paid modern work force (a so-called ‘labour aristocracy’) side by side with a larger, poorly
paid and less skilled work force as has been found in the international literature on industrialising
countries (see Haggard, 1990). Within construction, average earnings increased from 121 per cent
of the average industrial wage in 1995 to 145 per cent in 1999 (calculated from CSO data).
However, since most of the employment growth took place in services, it is more important
to identify the sub-sectors in which this took place. The single largest growth took place in
financial and other business services which showed an increase of 46 per cent between 1994 and
2000. Data on average earnings in banking, insurance and building societies show that these were
not keeping pace with the growth in average industrial earnings over the period of high
employment growth, increasing from 142 per cent of the average industrial wage in 1995 to 145 per
cent in 1999 by which time construction workers had caught up with them. The next highest growth
in service jobs took place in the transport, storage and communication category with an increase of
44.5 per cent. This is also a category characterised by some high-profile but low-pay employment,
as evidenced by a wave of strikes over low pay in the national airline, Aer Lingus, and the national
bus and train company, CIE, in late 2000 and early 2001. Substantial growth also took place in the
hotels and restaurant (37.2 per cent growth in jobs) and the wholesale and retail sub-sectors (28.2
per cent), also sectors characterised by relatively low-wage insecure jobs (Kirby, 2000: 232-3).
Data from the state training and employment authority, FÁS, on changes in the occupational
structure confirm that between 1995 and 2000 the numbers at work in manufacturing grew by
63,000 but those in market services grew by 168,000 of which the single largest category was
‘other market services’ with an increase of 73,000 jobs, followed by distribution (66,000 extra
jobs). Jobs in non-market services grew by 33,000, of which jobs in education and health grew by
30,000. Detailed breakdowns of these categories are available only up to 1997 at the time of
writing but these show that the largest increases in employment between 1993 and 1997 took place
in personal services (29,600 extra jobs), ‘other skilled workers’ and production operatives (24,600
extra jobs in each), clerical workers (22,200 extra jobs), associate professionals (20,300 extra jobs)
and managers (16,900) (see Hughes et al., 2000). Following Tansey (1998: 41), the employment
increase between 1993 and 1997 can be divided into the two categories of ‘highly qualified white
collar’ jobs (to use Tansey’s term) and blue collar jobs. This results in a total of 48,300 extra jobs
in the first category as against a total of 141,400 in the second, an increase of 16.6 per cent in the
first and 17.2 per cent in the second. Thus, rather than occupational up-grading, a more adequate
hypothesis to characterise changes in the occupational structure of the Irish workforce under the
Celtic Tiger might be occupational polarisation. This would reflect, in the Irish case, the emerging
dualism in the social structure of informational societies identified by Castells (1996: 201-326).
Looking at the conditions that characterise this employment, O’Connell points out that in
Ireland ‘so little is known about pay and conditions, about how much of part-time work is voluntary
or otherwise, nor about the stability of such work’ (1999: 228). However, examining the
fragmentary evidence that does exist, Kirby found growth in part-time employment, growth in other
                                                     
8 Unlike the data provided by CEPAL for Latin America, there is in the case of Ireland no breakdown available for jobs in the formal
and informal sectors, nor of rural and urban jobs.
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forms of atypical work, including a significant level of casualisation in the retail sector, growth in
employment on fixed-term contracts, and growth of temporary and part-time work and of
outcontracting in the food, drink and tobacco industry. In the food industry, a tendency towards the
underdevelopment or deskilling of the work force and the transformation of sections of the work
force into ‘self-employed’ contract workers was also found (Kirby, 2002a: 49-55). Examining the
growth in workers who gain temporary work through signing on with employment agencies,
Boucher and Wickham acknowledge that data on such workers in Ireland is unreliable and
incomplete but they report that Ireland has the highest percentage of workers on a temporary
employment agency contract in the EU (at 5.2 per cent) whereas the EU average is 2.2 per cent
(Boucher and Wickham, 2002: 13). This poses a question mark about Tansey’s positive conclusion
that ‘part-time work meets the needs and fits the circumstances of most of those who undertake it’
(Tansey, 1998: 40).
Evidence on earnings shows a rise in low-paid employment and a widening in earnings
dispersion between 1987 and 1994. Nolan estimates that there had not been a significant increase in
the number of employees on low pay between 1979 and 1987 nor had there been any significant
change in earnings dispersion over this period (Nolan, 1993). However, ESRI surveys in 1994 and
1997 show that ‘the ratio of the top to the bottom decile increased markedly, but this was
concentrated in the period from 1987 to 1994’ (Sexton, Nolan and McCormick, 1999: 65). Between
1994 and 1997 some categories of unskilled and semi-skilled workers improved their relative
position dramatically (particularly sales workers and personal service workers) due to rising
demand for such workers when supply was decreasing. As a result, the percentage of employees on
low pay fell back marginally from 23 per cent in 1994 to 22 per cent in 1997 (Barrett et al., 2000:
141). However, those at the top of the distribution continued pulling away from the median. This
was particularly marked for those in the 95th percentile whose earnings as a proportion of the
median increased from 2.4 in 1987, to 2.8 in 1994 and to 3.0 in 1997. Meanwhile those of the 99th
percentile increased from 3.6 to 3.8 and up to 4.3 over the same period. ‘So over the whole period
top earnings rose very rapidly, but it is only at the very top that there is any suggestion that this
might have accelerated from 1994 to 1997’ (Sexton et al., 1999: 65). While we don’t have more
recent data, the pressure of labour shortages in improving the relative earnings of unskilled and
semi-skilled workers is unlikely to have continued as unemployment began to increase from mid
2001. Finally, relative unit labour costs in Ireland in 2001 were 72 per cent of their 1995 level, the
lowest in the EU.
D. Quality of social provision
Despite the severe economic crisis of the 1980s and the assault on the welfare state taking
place in Britain at the time, the Irish welfare state if anything expanded in those years with
expenditure increasing from 10.7 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 13 per cent in 1985 (Cousins, 1995:
24). It had dropped to 9.8 per cent in 1990 and increased again to 10.9 per cent in 1992. In the high-
growth phase of the Celtic Tiger it has declined steadily and stood at 6.8 per cent in 2001.
However, in contrast to the universality of coverage that characterised the British welfare state in
the post-War period, the Irish system has, in Cousins’s words, ‘remained essentially fragmented
and showed little commitment to inter-class solidarity’ (20). One can conclude from the account of
Breen et al. (1990) that the Irish welfare state was never intended to be redistributive and was
inspired not by equality but by charity. Instead of using the period of economic boom to improve
the quantity and quality of social provision, since the early 1990s Ireland has diverged from the
European norm, both in terms of social expenditure and of government revenues (see Table 17). As
a percentage of GDP (and GNP), Ireland’s social expenditure and government revenues are now by
far the lowest in the EU. ‘The Irish public sector is now the smallest in the EU in relative terms,’
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states Ó Gráda (2002: 56). 9 Ireland has thus become a low-tax, low-spend economy compared to its
EU neighbours.
Table 17
TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURE, IRELAND AND EU, 1993-2000
(as % of GDP)
Ireland EU Ireland EU
1993 1993 2000 2000
Government current tax and non-tax receipts 38.6 43.2 33.8 43.9
Government expenditure on social protection 20.2 28.8 14.1 27.3
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook 71, 2002; Eurostat Social Protection in Europe 2003.
While the taxation and welfare systems are key instruments through which governments can
redistribute income and wealth, studies of the redistributive effects of the Irish tax and welfare
systems point to their inequities. Despite the high levels of economic growth which gave the state
greater scope for such reform in the 1990s, the income tax system was found to be less progressive
in the late 1990s than it had been in 1980. Though a number of steps have been taken which benefit
the lower paid, such as significant increases in personal tax allowances combined with modest
increases in exemption limits, or reductions in relief available on mortgage interest and private
health insurance contributions, other changes have tended to benefit the better off, such as the
reduction in the rate of capital gains tax from 40 per cent to 20 per cent in the 1998 budget. Thus,
no decisive move in the direction of a more egalitarian tax system is obvious. Examining the
redistributive effect of welfare payments, the ESRI found that between 1987 and 1994, the policy
of increasing some of the lowest welfare payments resulted in significant increases in disposable
income for the poorest 20 per cent of families, though many low and middle income earners saw a
decrease in disposable income as their payments did not increase as fast as earnings. Meanwhile
higher earners gained substantially from tax cuts. For the period 1994 to 1998, however, increases
in welfare rates have lagged further behind increases in wages with the result that the poorest 20
per cent have seen a significant decrease in disposable income and the gains, due to tax cuts, have
gone to higher earners (Callan et al., 1998: 24, 25). Furthermore, a failure to index social welfare
increases to increases in average earnings will result over the coming years in ‘a rise in the
numbers falling below half average income, or the lower poverty cut-off of 40 per cent of average
income,’ they state (32). The Irish welfare state has, therefore, proved ineffective in modifying in
any significant way the inequalities generated by market forces and, indeed, may even have
exacerbated them. In surveying welfare and taxation changes up to the end of the 1990s, Fitzgerald
concludes: ‘Welfare increases that lag behind earnings, and tax reductions focused on the
wealthier, are serving to widen not to narrow the gap between rich and poor. The unique
opportunity to tilt the system in the direction of those on lower incomes has been wasted’
(Fitzgerald, 2001: 192).
Neither has the state shown any great commitment to overturning inequalities in the
educational and health systems. While educational participation has been steadily increased over
recent decades, Smyth and Hannan find a ‘a notable persistence in educational inequalities by
social background’ (Smyth and Hannan, 2000: 117). They point out that, at second-level,
participation tends to be higher among those whose parents have higher levels of education while
educational under-performance is more evident among pupils from working class backgrounds,
whose parents are unemployed or have lower levels of education or who come from larger families.
                                                     
9 It should be noted that, in Ireland, most social expenditure is financed through taxation; social contributions play a smaller role than
in any other EU country except Denmark (see Timonen, 2002: 10).
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They find a widening gap between the professional and unskilled manual groups in their access to
full-time third-level education over the past two decades.
Furthermore, Archer found that public spending on education is regressive as the state
spends more on the education of better off young people who tend to remain in the system longer
than it does on young people from poorer backgrounds who tend to leave the system earlier.
Examining the significant expansion of special measures to tackle educational disadvantage, he
finds that it is not possible to say to what extent these have made a difference to the relative
position of disadvantaged schools (Archer, 2001). Thus, the available evidence points to the fact
that education tends to further marginalise those who come from more disadvantaged backgrounds
since, as Smyth and Hannan put it, ‘young people in Ireland who do not achieve educational
qualifications are disproportionately likely to experience labour market marginalisation in terms of
unemployment, insecure jobs and/or low pay’ (Smyth and Hannan, 2000: 125).
Recent research has also found deep structural inequalities in the Irish health system. As
Professor Brian Nolan described it:
‘The state now has a two-tier system with a divide that is much more pronounced than in
most other European Union countries. In other countries the rich can buy private care, but we have
allowed a structure to evolve whereby the public health services themselves incorporate faster
access and arguably better care for half the population, the half with more resources’ (Nolan,
2000).
He points to the growth in private health insurance, from 20 per cent cover 20 years ago to
almost 50 per cent cover now, as a sign of widespread dissatisfaction with the public health system.
Furthermore Tussing has identified a bias against public patients in that consultants are paid a
salary to treat them whereas they are paid a fee-for-service for private patients. ‘A health economist
would predict the consequence of this unhappy combination would be that consultants would
favour private patients,’ he wrote (Tussing, 2001). In such a situation it is not surprising that people
whose annual income is below £10,000 have disability rates four times as high as those whose
income is more than £29,000, that the mortality rate of infants of poorer parents is 50 per cent
higher than for infants of better off parents, or that the death rate for men from heart disease in
Ireland, already the highest in the EU, is doubled for men who are low-earners or who live in
socially deprived areas (The Irish Times, 1, 2 January 2001).
E. Inequalities
There are fears that the economic growth associated with the Celtic Tiger is exacerbating
regional inequalities. For example, research for the Western Development Commission shows that
between 1991 and 1996 the average annual growth in net industrial output in the seven western
counties (traditionally the country’s poorest which suffered continuous high levels of emigration
since the 1850s to the present day) was 3.7 per cent compared to a national rate of 12.7 per cent.
Over the same period, these counties’ share of national industrial output dropped from 14.6 per
cent to 9.6 per cent (WDC, 1999: 11). Furthermore, between 1993 and 1997 employment in IDA-
backed companies in these western counties increased by 22.8 per cent as against an increase of
55.1 per cent in Leinster and 67.1 per cent in Dublin (12). Liam Scollan, chief executive of the
Western Development Commission, a state agency charged with spearheading development in the
west, has been quoted as saying that ‘the incremental approach which is being taken is probably not
going to be sufficient to reverse long-standing trends’ (The Irish Times, 2 February 2001).
The impact of the economic boom on gender inequalities has been more positive, but it too is
not without its darker sides. Women’s participation in the labour force has increased from under 28
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per cent in 1971, to 35 per cent in 1986 and up to 44 per cent in 1999 (O’Connell, 2000: 60).
Though participation rates remain relatively low by European standards, there appears to be some
convergence towards the European average over the 1990s. However, Fahey et al. point out that
among women with children under 5 years of age, Ireland still has the lowest activity rate in
Europe; in Ireland, along with Italy and Greece, less than half this group are active in the labour
market whereas in Denmark 80 per cent are. Similarly Irish mothers with children up to 10 years of
age have participation rates among the lowest in Europe. They point to the extremely low provision
of early childhood and publicly-funded childcare services in Ireland compared to Europe as
constituting an obstacle to higher levels of participation by women in these groups (Fahey et al.,
2000: 258).
Gender differentials in pay have decreased from 56-57 per cent in the period 1955-72 to 75
per cent in 1998. However Fahey et al. now see grounds for doubting that the differentials will
continue to narrow as continuing labour market expansion may attract women with fewer
qualifications into the workforce. They also find that women continue to be over-represented and
under-represented in the same professions in the late 1990s as they were in the 1970s. While they
welcome women’s growing representation in managerial occupations and their stable but high
representation within professional and associate professional jobs, they report ‘evidence of
considerable vertical segregation within these occupations, and women are severely under-
represented in the very top layers of those occupations’ (262). Finally, in studying the risk of
poverty for women between 1987 and 1994, Nolan and Watson found the poverty risk for women
living alone increased from 4 per cent to 24 per cent and for female lone parents who were heads of
households it also increased sharply, from 17.4 per cent to 31.7 per cent (Nolan and Watson, 1999:
18-9). They also found that, for individual women, their risk of being in poverty had increased over
the same period at a rate greater than the risk for men (62) and that the risk of women being low-
paid, while being equal to that of men when below the age of 25, becomes much greater than that
for men when the women are aged between 35 and 44 (87).
F. Towards a concept of ‘social vulnerability’
This section has assembled evidence on the social impact of Ireland’s high levels of
economic growth. While some of it might be disputed by those who see the changes of the 1990s in
a largely positive light, much of it would be readily accepted. Where more substantial differences
lie is in the significance attached to such evidence. For example, three economists who offer a very
positive account of the Celtic Tiger summarise its distributional impact by saying that, if Ireland’s
decline in unemployment from 17 to 4 per cent ‘was achieved partly through a rise in the level of
relative inequality, many might regard the trade-off as acceptable’ (among whom they number
themselves) (Clinch, Convery and Walsh, 2002: 36). With their focus on the functioning of the
economy, economists by and large tend not to attribute major significance to ways in which this
may be damaging social cohesion and they believe further growth can address such issues. Left-
wing analysts of the Celtic Tiger tend to regard it in the opposite light, highlighting its social
damage but minimising its economic achievements. O’Hearn, applying a theoretical framework
drawn from dependency theory, argues that growing poverty and inequality follow from the Irish
state’s commitment to a model of dependent industrialisation which requires that it puts the
profitability of multinational companies above the social needs of its own citizens (see O’Hearn,
1998, 2000). Allen offers a more conventional Marxist account of the Celtic Tiger which
emphasises how it has enriched a small elite while leaving the rest of the population relatively less
well off, resulting in a ‘discontented majority’ (Allen, 2000: 6).
One way of mediating these two extreme positions is to make an object of study the
meanings attributed to the phenomenon of the Celtic Tiger, to undertake what can be called a study
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of its ‘cultural political economy’. This approach is inspired by the work of Tucker: ‘From a
cultural perspective we must consider people’s values, ideas, and beliefs, their identity and
feelings, how they view the world and their place in it, and what is meaningful to them’ (Tucker,
1997: 4). In this context, significance can be attributed to evidence that in Ireland suicide is the
most common cause of death among males between the ages of 15 and 24 and that the rate of
suicide among men aged between 25 and 34 is the second highest in this category in the EU. A
sharp rise of 94 per cent in violent assaults and of 83 per cent in sexual offences between 2000 and
2001 (part of which may be due to changes in the way such data are compiled by the Irish police
though other categories of crime did not rise by similar amounts) lends support to media reporting
of such cases. The murder rate has also risen sharply in Ireland since the early 1990s at a time when
it has stabilised in Britain: 60 murders were recorded in 2001 as against 25 in 1992. Per capita
alcohol consumption, traditionally low in Ireland compared to other European countries, rose by 41
per cent between 1989 and 1999, by far the highest increase in the EU. Reflecting on these trends
in Irish society in the 1990s, a leading professor of psychiatry concluded that ‘there are worrying
trends to suggest that the civic order is in disarray’ (Casey, 2002). The cultural political economy
of the Celtic Tiger can also be examined through examples of critical media discourse (for a further
elaboration of the concept of a ‘cultural political economy’, see Kirby, 2002b: 22). Based on this
evidence, Kirby identifies some meanings attributed to it: ‘Values such as individualism,
materialism, intolerance of dissent, lack of concern for the environment and a failure to value
caring are identified as characterising life under the Celtic Tiger (2002: 159). As Flynn put it in
writing about the mood of a group of Irish holidaymakers returning home from Spain: ‘This wasn’t
just the customary gripes at the end of a holiday; there was the clear sense that people were no
longer proud of where they lived and where they worked and where they were raising their
children’ (Flynn, 2002).
Such evidence points to the lack of a sense of social well-being in the Ireland of the Celtic
Tiger and seems poorly captured either by the emphasis of neo-classical economists on ‘quality of
life issues’ or of their Marxist critics on a discontented majority. For the malaise seems to stem
from a sense of dislocation, an alienation from Irish society and its values. The work of the 20th
century social theorist, Karl Polanyi, offers an understanding of what is causing this. In his classic
work, The Great Transformation (1944; the 1957 edition is used here), Polanyi argued that the
Industrial Revolution in Britain constituted a social catastrophe even while it led to economic
improvement. He based his view on the fact that ‘a social calamity is primarily a cultural not an
economic phenomenon that can be measured by income figures or population statistics’ and ‘it lies
in the lethal injury to the institutions in which [a person’s] social existence is embodied’ (1957:
157). Polanyi sees poverty and social dislocation as arising from the imposition of the self-
regulating market on society as happened with the advent of the Industrial Revolution. The self-
regulating market treated labour, land and money as commodities and therefore led to ‘the running
of society as an adjunct to the market’ (57) which ‘required that the individual respect economic
law even if it happened to destroy him’ (85). From this arose the baffling paradox for Polanyi that
poverty and plenty went hand in hand as constitutive features of this market society, as he called it.
Olofsson describes the means through which this happened: ‘Disembedding means being cut loose
from traditional protective as well as oppressive ties and institutions, and more dependent on the
changing fortunes of the market processes. The larger the impact of disembedding processes the
more working populations will be exposed to general and abstract market processes’ (1995: 109).
Polanyi’s insights offer a more satisfactory way of understanding what at first acquaintance
seems a paradox: a sense of dislocation and alienation in the midst of a booming economy with full
employment and rising income levels. Acknowledging this paradox alerts us to the fact that we
poorly understand the factors that constitute social well-being and that our dominant approaches
within social analysis seem ill-equipped at both a theoretical and a methodological level to address
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the issue adequately (for an attempt to theorise the issue of social well-being in the Irish case, and
in particular the contribution equality of condition makes to it, see Kirby, 2001a). In the context of
globalisation, the concept of human security is being used as a way of capturing the new forms of
uncertainty and risk associated with it (see Harriss-White, 2002). Indeed, a project for the
publication of an annual Human Security Report beginning in 2003, complementing the UNDP’s
Human Development Report, is far advanced. However, the concept of human security, with its
attention to threats to people’s right to live, work, and participate without fear in social, political
and economic structures (see Rojas Aravena, 2002) fails to capture some of the dimensions of
social dislocation and alienation identified in the Irish case. In the UNDP’s Human Development
Reports on Chile, the concept of human security has been broadened to incorporate the erosion of
social bonds and a sense of anxiety and uncertainty about the future (see in particular PNUD,
2000). However, the concept of insecurity seems too narrow to capture what is being identified
here since, strictly speaking, its meaning is limited to a fear of what might happen. The sense of
dislocation identified in the Irish and Chilean cases seems better captured by the concept of ‘social
vulnerability’ since its core meaning relates not just to a fear of what might happen but to the
liability to be damaged or harmed, thereby drawing attention to the harm actually being done to the
fragile bonds of social belonging. Following the insights of Polanyi, the source of this liability can
be identified in the inroads of market principles into the running of society (for an application of
this to social well-being in Latin America, see Kirby, 2002c). Based on the evidence of the social
impact of the Celtic Tiger, a further clarification of what this concept might mean, its theoretical
refinement, and the elaboration of indicators to measure it seem urgent tasks.
The policy implications of such an approach are also important since they direct attention to
the need for public authorities to ensure that the market serves society rather than destroying it.
This, for example, would require broadening the responsibilities of regulatory agencies beyond
their present role of facilitating the efficient and competitive functioning of markets; instead, such
public authorities would have to give priority to social objectives. In a globalised world, this cannot
be left to action at the national level alone since states would be fearful of adverse economic
consequences. It will require determined action at an international level to ensure that markets are
constrained so that, as far as possible, social cohesion and equality is strengthened.
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VI. Is the ‘Irish model’ sustainable?
As the Celtic Tiger faltered from mid 2001, a debate raged
within the economics literature as to whether this period of
exceptional growth signifies a delayed convergence with Ireland’s
neighbours or a regional boom. The first view rests on the standard
Solow economic growth model which predicts that convergence
occurs among economies that are similar in such elements as
macroeconomic stability, trade openness and educational standards.
According to this view, what needs explaining is not Ireland’s boom
but what delayed it so long in achieving convergence with its nearest
neighbours; such culprits as late liberalization, irresponsible fiscal
management and a bloated public sector are identified (see Ó Gráda,
2002). Those proposing the second view, however, argue that
orthodox economic policies may be necessary but are not sufficient to
achieve the high-growth rates recently experienced by Ireland. For
this, such non-orthodox policies as an active industrial policy or
structural fund transfers are also needed. The implications for the
future of these two different perspectives are highlighted by Barry: ‘If
the convergence view is correct, it suggests that we can now rest on
our laurels: as long as we do not introduce inappropriate policies we
are unlikely to fall behind average EU living standards. If the regional
view is correct however, it suggests that external shocks to our ability
to attract FDI might have serious long-term consequences for the
economy’ (Barry, 2002: 90).
Barry emphasises that the risks facing the Irish economy are
from external sources, mentioning a prolonged US recession, EU tax
harmonisation and competitive challenges from central and eastern
European  states  as  constituting  threats  to  Ireland’s ability to attract
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high levels of FDI. However, the downturn in the Irish economy since 2001 points to internal
sources of vulnerability also, thereby revealing the structural weaknesses of the ‘Irish model of
economic and social governance’ (Laffan and O’Donnell, 1998: 165). Three such weaknesses can
be identified: i) its dependence on high levels of FDI; ii) its narrow tax base; and iii) pressures
generated by growing income inequality. Each is treated in turn.
A. FDI
According to UNCTAD, FDI into Ireland fell from US$24 billion in 2000 to $10 billion in
2001. The Irish industrial development agency, Forfás, reports that it has continued to fall during
2002. While 13,500 new jobs were created in foreign-owned companies in Ireland in 2001, 17,500
were lost in the same period, the first net job losses in the foreign-owned sector for 15 years.
Though Ireland’s manufacturing growth rate remains the highest in the EU, this is seriously
distorted by the contribution of the foreign-owned chemicals sector which includes production of
the drug Viagra, used to treat male impotence. Former Irish Taoiseach (prime minister) and
professional economist, Dr Garret FitzGerald, estimates that this ‘Viagra sector’ as he calls it gives
‘a false impression of the overall trend of industry activity’ since it employs 2 per cent of all
manufacturing workers and contributes 3.5 per cent of manufacturing earnings but reports a Gross
Value Added of between 24 per cent and 40 per cent of the whole of Irish manufacturing.
Correcting for this distortion, FitzGerald estimates manufacturing output in mid 2002 to be 10 per
cent lower than in early 2001 (FitzGerald, 2002). Unemployment, traditionally a major problem in
the Irish economy, had fallen to its lowest point of 3.6 per cent of the labour force in early 2001;
since then it has shown a steady rise to 4.2 per cent by the middle of 2002. However, due to a major
expansion in public sector employment (for some commentators, this is related to the general
election of mid May 2002) this figure masks a sharp decline in manufacturing employment over the
period. It has been estimated that in the absence of this growth in the public sector, unemployment
would have risen to around 6 per cent by late 2002 (Keena, 2002). With a growing public sector
deficit, this expansion in public employment is unlikely to continue.
B. Tax base
The second vulnerable element results from the state’s narrow tax base due to its low
corporation tax rate (a key element in its strategy to attract FDI), its reduction of income tax rates
throughout the second half of the 1990s (as part of a trade off to maintain wage competitiveness
through modest wage rises negotiated centrally), and its low taxes on wealth and on property. One
result of this has been that tax receipts from income have fallen far faster with the onset of the
economic downturn than was expected (income tax receipts were 11.2 per cent lower in the first
eight months of 2002 than in the same period the previous year). While no one has yet offered an
explanation for this, it is speculated that many of those who lost their jobs in contracting sectors
(often relatively high-pay sectors) have found employment in sectors paying lower wages, with the
result that these workers pay less of their income in tax or pay no income tax at all. The other major
decline in tax receipts comes from a higher-than-expected downturn in receipts from corporation
tax. As a result, throughout 2002, the government has had to revise upwards its projections for the
size of the budget deficit in late 2002, from a projection in late 2001 of a surplus of €170m, to in
mid 2002 a projected deficit of €300m, to in October 2002 an expected deficit of €1.3bn. Though
the projected GDP deficit for 2002 is 0.3 per cent, well within the ceiling of 3 per cent set by the
EU under its Growth and Stability Pact, some economists have predicted a deficit of around 1.5 per
cent in 2003. Meanwhile, attempts to limit the size of the budget deficit are already leading to
cutbacks in social spending in areas like health and education for the disadvantaged.
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C. Income inequality
The third element of vulnerability arises from the impact of the social partnership process.
While centralised negotiations resulted in relatively modest wage rises for all workers, those in
booming private sectors managed in a period of skilled labour shortages to win additional wage
rises. This resulted in public sector workers seeing their relative position worsening, the impact of
which was especially evident to them in the context of a housing market that was more and more
out of their reach. Government responded by establishing a ‘benchmarking’ review to compare
public and private sector jobs and recommend percentage wage rises for public sector workers to
keep them in line with comparable jobs in the private sector. Unfortunately for the government, the
report of the benchmarking review group, avidly awaited by public sector unions, was published in
July 2002 in a period of growing budgetary restraint. Though it did not reveal the methodology it
used to arrive at its conclusions, it recommended an average pay increase of 8.9 per cent
throughout the public sector. However, these varied greatly between different professions and
different grades within the one profession, with recommended increases varying from a low of 2.5
per cent to a high of 25 per cent. Overall, it is estimated the increases would add 1 billion euro a
year to the government’s pay bill. While payment would worsen the state of the public finances,
postponement would almost certainly prompt serious industrial action in a restive public service.
Each of these elements of Ireland’s current economic downturn arise from structural features
of the Irish ‘success story’. They confirm O’Riain’s analysis written before growth slumped:
‘This model of development also turns out to be Janus-faced. Its success, based on a
profound internationalisation of social and economic life through flexible state institutions, turns
out to be the major threat to its sustainability as these multiple globalisations generate an inequality
and enormous political tensions that the decentralised state institutions have great difficulty
containing’ (2000: 183).
Much will therefore depend on how the state responds.
D. Responses to current downturn
The predominant policy response is not to change in any fundamental way what is widely
seen as a highly successful strategy. The Irish government's immediate response has three prongs to
it. Firstly, it seeks to follow the same growth strategy that in its view has been so successful, that is
attracting to Ireland multinational investment in three key areas – IT, pharmaceuticals and financial
services. The government’s hope is that the present international economic downturn will be
temporary and that FDI will soon pick up again. The second prong to its strategy is a National
Development Plan (NDP) for the period 2000-2006, involving investment of some 50 billion euro
or 9.8 per cent of GNP per year, designed to address major infrastructural defects and create new
regional growth poles around the country. Over half of the expenditure (52 per cent) is to be spent
on physical infrastructure and a further 36 per cent on education and training, R&D and industry
support. This spending includes 3.8 billion euro in EU structural funds over this period and 2.3
billion euro from the private sector. An innovative part of the NDP involves a major investment
programme in third-level research, the first ever significant investment in the area by the Irish
government. This includes a Programme for Research in Third-Level Institutions (PRTLI) which
spent over 600 million euro between 1999 and 2002 establishing research institutes in Irish
universities, the establishment of an Irish Research Council for Science, Engineering and
Technology and an Irish Research Council for the Humanities and the Social Sciences, and the
establishment of Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) to foster a world-class research capability in
biotechnology, and information and communications technology. SFI had an initial funding of 635
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million euro. Through this, the third element of the government’s strategy for long-term
development, it is hoped to create an active research culture with knock-on effects for job creation.
While public officials maintain a strong commitment to funding the NDP even amid budgetary
cutbacks, the Taoiseach (prime minister), Bertie Ahern, admitted publicly that ‘we would be
stretched to the very limit to implement most of the National Development Plan’ (The Irish Times,
11 September 2002) and a leaked Department of Finance memo revealed that money put aside for
capital spending for the period 2002-05 would not be enough to pay for what is planned under the
NDP (The Irish Times, 27 September 2002).
However, even if the growth strategy outlined above is successful and if international
conditions turn positive, this would ease but not resolve the structural weaknesses in the Irish
model. In terms of Ireland’s dependence on high levels of US FDI, the changing nature of the
European Union is almost certain to intensify pressure, on at least two specific fronts. The first
relates to growing pressure for tax harmonisation that has the potential of undermining the tax
advantages widely seen as a major reason for Ireland’s success in attracting high levels of FDI. The
Irish government is resisting such moves strenuously and mounted an intense and successful
diplomatic effort to prevent agreement at the Nice summit in December 2000. However, the Irish
stance is reported to have angered some of its larger partners and, while temporarily avoided, tax
harmonisation remains a central demand of those states that espouse a more federal Europe. It
raised its head again in late 2002 as Ireland was reported to be resisting efforts to have tax
harmonisation included in early drafts of a major new treaty being drawn up by the Convention on
the Future of Europe (as reported in The Irish Times, 4 November 2002). The second major
challenge relates to budget transfers to Ireland, both through structural funding and through such
mechanisms as the Common Agricultural Policy. Though, in 2001, Ireland still remained a net
beneficiary from the EU with a net balance in its favour of 1.2 billion euro or 1.13 per cent of its
GNP, it is soon expect to become a net contributor. This will further test a model that has relied on
large amounts of social investment from the EU. Neither can it be predicted what impact
enlargement will have on the Union and on the competitive advantage Ireland has gained as a
member. For example, a number of the new member states (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia) are likely to be effective competitors with Ireland for FDI. While, in the first six
months of 2002 new investment projects into Ireland were declining by almost 28 per cent, in
eastern and central Europe foreign investment projects increased by 54 per cent, mostly from the
United States (Ernst & Young, 2002). Furthermore, all the new member states will require high
levels of EU social funding to which Ireland will be a net contributor. Added to the internal strains
emerging, therefore, the external context for Ireland’s success is turning much more challenging.
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VII. Globalisation, Ireland and Latin
America: Policy lessons
On the 2002 and the 2003 A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy
Magazine Globalization Index, Ireland was found to be the most
globalised country in the world (Foreign Policy, 2002: 38-51; 2003:
60-72). This signals the significance of the Irish case for examining
the room for manoeuvre of relatively peripheral states and economies
in the context of deepening globalisation. The policy lessons are
particularly relevant for countries like those in Latin America whose
development trajectory bears marked similarities to that of Ireland.
Both Latin America and Ireland have moved from being primary
commodity exporters with a weak industrial base, through decades of
import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), to a painful adaptation to
the disciplines of market liberalisation (see Kirby, 2002a: 11-25). This
trajectory saw the state playing a leading role in fostering indigenous
industry only to run up against the constraints imposed by a limited
home market and growing balance of payments deficits. Ireland
became convinced of the benefits of liberalisation earlier than did
Latin America, moving to open its economy from the early 1960s
onwards and putting in place incentives to attract multinational
companies. However, despite its earlier liberalisation, Ireland waited
another three decades to experience the surge of growth that now
identifies it as a model of successful development in a globalised era.
The Irish case offers three major policy lessons for Latin
America. The first is a very positive lesson about the continuing
potential in a globalised world for the state to play an active role in
fostering competitive advantages in the economy. The second lesson is
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a more cautionary one, and relates to the dangers of believing that industrialisation can be bought.
The third lesson concerns the social impact of economic growth and the need for the state to
develop more robust instruments to mediate this relationship. Each are dealt with separately here.
A. State potential
The most positive lesson that Ireland offers to Latin America is the active role the state has
played in fostering an industrial base and in seeking to upgrade the technological profile of its
industry. The move from being primarily an exporter of unprocessed dairy products 40 years ago to
being primarily an exporter of high-tech industrial goods in the 1990s makes it comparable to the
East Asian dragons. It is particularly noteworthy that, from the mid 1980s onwards, as Latin
American states were implementing policies that weakened their industrial capacity, Ireland was
deepening and extending its active industrial policies, targeting key emerging multinational
companies in the sectors it had prioritised and fostering a more active indigenous innovative
capacity through creating networks between the state, universities, and companies. The emergence
of an indigenous software industry is the principal success of this latter policy. Throughout it all,
the state showed a relatively strong commitment to education, ensuring even amid the cutbacks of
the 1980s that educational investment was maintained. It needs to be remembered also that the state
which displayed such capacity in the 1990s was for long seen as a particularly ineffective state. For
example, a major study of the Irish state published in 1990 concluded that ‘the state’s capacity – so
formidable on paper – on closer examination proves to be illusory’ (Breen et al., 1990: 213). A
decade later, no student of the Irish state could write this. Overall then, Ireland’s economic success
in the 1990s demonstrates the continuing central role that the state needs to play in fostering the
capacities for competitive success in a globalised economy. Indeed, the Irish state in the 1990s has
even been described as a ‘flexible developmental state’, though this has been criticised for being
overly selective of the evidence on which it is based (see Kirby, 2001b). Turning to Latin America,
it is paradoxical that many of its larger states displayed much more innovative capacity than did the
Irish state during the period of ISI but appear to have lost much of this capacity with liberalisation.
B. The narrow base of success
If the first lesson of the Irish case is comparable to the success of the East Asian dragons, the
second lesson shows where it diverged from their success. For, as highlighted above, the difficulty
about the Irish case is that it concentrated for too long on fostering an industrial base that depended
more and more on foreign multinationals. Despite active policies to develop linkages with
indigenous suppliers and to encourage multinationals to situate more R&D activity in Ireland, much
of the industrial base created through active state policies remains weakly embedded in the national
economy. This was expressed by a leading economist in 1998 who characterised the Irish success
as ‘the US high-tech tiger with the Celtic face’ (Murphy, 1998: 3). While the presence of leading
multinational companies in the Irish economy has undoubtedly developed skills, a management
culture and technological know-how in the Irish labour force, one economist has questioned the
value for money that this represented (O’Sullivan, 1995). More crucially for the future, it has
created a path dependency on buying in industrial capacity rather than on fostering it from within
which permeates Irish political and business culture and will be very difficult to change. Ireland’s
success over the second half of the 1990s has masked rather than changed its high level of
dependence which makes it particularly vulnerable to the new competitive environment that is
emerging in the European Union.
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This offers important policy lessons for Latin American countries which are also
increasingly dependent on FDI for their development. The principal lesson of the Irish case is that
the state needs to devote attention to ensuring that the technological capacity and managerial skills
brought by multinational capital become strongly embedded in the domestic economy. In believing
that foreign capital would develop the Irish economy for it, the Irish state reinforced the long-term
dependence on attracting foreign capital that is now one of its greatest vulnerabilities. An active
industrial policy, therefore, needs to go far further than simply attracting high-quality foreign
investment. It needs to be guided by a strategic vision of how this will be used to help develop
strong and enduring domestic capacities which can underpin a dynamic national system of
innovation. For the Irish case shows that foreign investment can, under optimal international
conditions, engineer an economic boom but that this can happen without the development of a
national system of innovation. This, therefore, offers a cautionary lesson to policy makers in Latin
America, a lesson which emphasises the more solid basis for long-term success built through the
development of strong indigenous capacity in East Asia. In many ways, the Irish state had it too
easy and has not yet had to face the really difficult task of fostering indigenous success.
C. Mediating between economy and society
In turning to the social impact of Ireland’s high economic growth, the major policy lesson
concerns the failure of the state to establish robust goals for social policy and to find means to
achieve them. Instead, economic goals have taken on a primacy in public policy with social goals
being defined in largely aspirational terms and made dependent on economic success. Examples are
the state’s failure to establish any goals for the reduction of relative poverty or income inequality,
or the failure to ensure that housing provision responds to social imperatives rather than economic
ones. The state’s approach towards social provision in Celtic Tiger Ireland can be characterised as
an example of ‘Third Way’ social policies as formulated by Anthony Giddens including
community-focused approaches, investment in human capital and programmes for the active
development of civil society (Giddens, 1998: Chapter 4). Giddens elsewhere stated that a key
criterion to judge the success of such policies was their ability to embody a redistributional
programme and to maintain the classic concerns of social democracy with social justice and the
battle against inequality (Giddens, 1999: 17). On this criterion, Ireland’s partnership approach
towards social provision has failed. This has been very short-sighted for not only has it contributed
to deepening social divisions but the growth of inequality is itself undermining economic success.
This alerts policy makers to the vital need to attend to social goals and not make them subservient
to economic growth. The Irish experience also shows how ‘Third Way’ approaches are no
substitute for more traditional means of redistribution through the taxation and welfare systems.
Two principal policy lessons can be derived from this. One is the need to ensure that taxation
systems and the levels of revenue they raise for the state are adequate to the increasing demands
placed on the state if it is to achieve success in a globalised world. The Irish case alerts Latin
American policy makers to the implications for a country’s tax base of extreme reliance on foreign
investment, since it has used low levels of corporation tax as its main competitive advantage and
has ensured wage competitiveness through trading cuts in income tax for wage moderation. These
are structural features of the ‘Irish model’. This has resulted in ever greater deficits in
infrastructural and social development but it has also weakened greatly the capacity of the state to
invest in developing the innovative capacity that is the only sure basis for long-term success. This
was something totally neglected by the Irish state up to the late 1990s when initial and very
promising moves to invest in innovation fell victim to budget cutbacks in 2002 and 2003. It is too
early yet to know how much damage such cutbacks are going to inflict but they indicate a less than
wholehearted commitment by the state to investing in innovation. Ireland shows that trading tax
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levels for competitive advantage undermines the very success it is trying to achieve. The second
lesson relates to institutions. On the one hand, the Irish case seems to show impressive institutional
innovation in such areas as social partnership and industrial policy. On the other however, it alerts
Latin American policy makers to the dangers of confusing institutional proliferation with
institutional innovation. The Irish state has tended to establish ever more institutions, each
responding to particular demands on the state, while failing to develop a larger strategic vision
which could underpin a coherent reform of state institutions. Not only is such a proliferation of
state institutions unaffordable in the long-run but, more importantly, it greatly weakens coherence
and even legitimacy as citizens come to lose faith in the state’s ability to achieve objectives,
particularly those relating to social needs. This is ever more evident in the Irish case drawing
attention to the need to develop not only state capacity but a coherence that allows economic and
social goals be progressively met in tandem.
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Conclusions
The Irish case and the policy lessons derived from it raise
deeper questions about the nature of economic success in a globalised
world and the social costs of that success. For policy makers, these
inevitably raise painful dilemmas as to the ability of the state in a
globalised world to guide the market in ways that are socially
beneficial. Unfortunately, the Irish experience throws little light on
such dilemmas as economic success has been achieved through the
state facilitating the operation of the market rather than guiding it
towards more developmental ends.10 It is therefore a cautionary tale of
the social costs of economic success in a globalised world. Policy
makers in states which have not experienced much economic success
may be tempted to settle for such a trade off. But its longer-term social
costs and their threats to its sustainability should not be
underestimated.
                                                     
10 This found expression in one revealing comment by a well-known Irish economist, Jim Power, who was reported as saying at a
public meeting: ‘I have no political bias but I believe that, for the past five years, the country took very little to govern. The
government were faced with very few difficult decisions’ (reported in The Irish Times, 19 September 2002: 14).
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